VlAY  15      ^'f 

ROSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION 

TO 

ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


BY 

JOHN  1  AVATA  BRUNO,  Pu  D. 


Suhmittt^a  ill  partial  ftilfllment  of  the  re«|aireinent»  for  the  decree  of  Doctor  of 
1*lill«i*ophy  In  lh«  Faculty  of  Philosophy,  Columbia  University 


ARCHIVES    OF    PHIJL080PHY 

BDITKD    BT 

KPEDKRICK  J.   E.   WOODBHIDGK 


No.    6,    FEBRUAKY,    1916 


NEW   YOBK 

THE  SCIENCE   PRESS 

lettt 


fi.'iR5;r::r:: 


ROSMIXI-S  CONTRIBUTION 

TO 

ETIIICxVL  PniLOSOPTlY 


BY 


JOHN  FAY  ATA  BRUNO,  PuT). 

V 


Submitted  In  partial  fuUilmeut  of  the  requirements  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of 
Philosophy  In  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy,  Columbia  miverslty 


ARCHIVES    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

EDITED    Br 

FPEDERICK  J.  K.  WOODBBIDGK 


No.  0,  February,  191G 


NEW   YORK 
THE  SCIENCE  PRESS 

1910 


^8B7 


Press  of 

THE  New  Era  Printing  Cohpany 

Lancaster,  pa. 


V 

K^ 


OUTLINE 

PA<n 

Introduction    1 

Part    I.  The  Factors  of  Kosmini  's  Philosophy 3 

Chapter    I.  Historical  Situation  of  Rosmini  's  Italy 3 

1.  Social  and  Political  Conditions  3 

2.  Intellectual  Conditions    7 

Chapter  II.  Eosmini  's  Personality    17 

1.  Rosmini  's  Psychological  Dispositions 17 

2.  Rosmini 's  Leading  Motive,  Attitude,  and  Method 20 

3.  The  Fundamental  Principle  of  Rosmini 's  Philosophy  23 

Part  II.  The  Essential  Features  of  Rosmini 's  Ethical  Theory 25 

Introductory.     The  Scope  and  Method  of  Ethics 25 

Chapter    I.  The  Metaphysical  Factor  of  Morality  28 

Chapter  II.  The  Psychological  Factor  of  Morality 36 

Conclusion    • 45 


•  •  • 

111 


ROSMINrS 
CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

INTRODUCTION 

The  philosopher's  life  evolves  in  space  and  time,  in  a  certain  en- 
vironment anil  at  a  certain  historical  period,  the  influence  of  which 
he  can  not  fail  to  undergo.  And,  indeed,  through  his  education  and 
his  surroundings,  his  native  qiudities  are  stimidatetl  and  uioditicd, 
his  mind  is  molded  to  certain  habits  of  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting. 
He  feels  impelled  to  share  the  aim  and  disposition  of  his  time  and 
race.  And  thus  every  phase  of  his  thought  and  behavior  is  but  a 
concrete,  effective  response  to  those  specific  needs,  to  those  human 
problems  which,  being  closely  connected  with  social  life,  focus  the 
attention  of  all.  We  can  not,  accordingly,  consider  his  doctrine  as 
an  arbitrary,  autonomous  construction  of  ideas;  we  can  not  imagine 
it  to  be  born  spontaneously  or  by  chance.  The  philosopher,  anxious 
to  bring  his  own  contribution  to  social  order,  organizes  a  mode  of  re- 
flective thinking  ([uite  personal.  His  philosophy,  as  every  organized 
thought,  inspired  and  controlled  by  a  practical  motive,  is  but  his 
characteristic  mode  of  adjustment  to  the  current  state  of  culture,  to 
the  prevailing  Zeitgeist,  and  to  tlKit  peculiar  situation  in  which  he 
happens  to  be.  It  embodies  his  concrete  thinking,  his  lofty  aspira- 
tions, and  his  endeavors  to  be  useful  to  social  organization.  Thus 
we  can  not  doubt  that  his  point  of  view,  his  method,  his  mental  atti- 
tude, all  his  psychological  situation  and  activity  are  determined  and 
conditioned  by  his  own  genius,  notions,  habits,  and  motives,  as  well 
as  by  contemporary  social  conditions.  His  philosophical  elaborations 
may  be  regarded  rather  as  a  human  and  historical  document.  For 
they  mirror  the  experiences  and  strivings,  the  wishes  and  hopes,  the 
whole  intimate  drama  of  his  life.  They  display  the  tints  which  he, 
as  an  artist,  imparts  to  his  assumption,  combination,  and  solution  of 
philosophical  problems  which  always  appear  anew  to  each  age  and 
to  each  individual.  And  while  they  happen  to  be  the  genuine  and 
abiding  expression  of  his  personality,  they  manifest  the  status  of 
vital  questions  towards  which  the  general  interest  converges,  and  the 
social  demands  that  haunt  minds  at  the  time  in  which  the  philosopher 
lives. 

"VVe  may,  accordingly,  explain  why  a  philosophical  sj'.stem  has  a 
momentous  significance,  and  even  a  powerful  influence  on  the  direc- 

1 


*2''  ^    :sd^?I-HXI'S  CONTEIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  P HI LO SOPHY 

tion  of  coutemporary  minds;  and  yet  its  justification  passes  away 
with  its  historical  conditions.  Experience,  and  consequently  philos- 
ophy, which  is  the  emotional  and  intellectual  attitude  of  an  individual 
towards  the  urgent  problems  of  life,  follows  social  changes.  Thus, 
a  philosophical  doctrine  may  be  a  useful  instrument  of  social  adjust- 
ment at  a  certain  age,  owing  to  social  conditions  which  evoke  it,  and 
it  may,  however,  lose  all  its  value  at  another  age,  because  of  new 
social  emergencies  which  call  out  new  purposes  and  new  habitual 
modes  of  confronting  problems,  and  then  new  reflective  thinking. 

Thus,  if  we  want  to  know  the  meaning,  character,  and  value  of 
a  philosophical  system,  we  must  replace  it  in  its  historical  frame, 
in  its  natural  background.  We  must  regard  it  as  the  mental  atti- 
tude which  the  philosopher  assumed  towards  the  problems  which 
were  in  the  air  when  he  lived.  Only  thus  can  we  retrace  the  genesis 
of  his  ideas,  his  fundamental  thought,  and  the  leading  motive  of 
his  intellectual  efforts.  Only  then  may  we  have  the  surest  basis 
for  understanding  and  appreciating  his  doctrine.  To  regard  it  as 
something  merely  abstract  and  isolated  from  human  conditions,  as 
independent  of  its  author 's  universe  of  life  and  love,  aloof  from  his 
reality  and  experience,  or  divorced  from,  and  unrelated  to  the  de- 
mands and  interests  of  his  social  milieu,  would  lead  to  inevitable 
failure. 

To  valuate  Eosmini's  contribution  to  ethical  philosophy  it  is 
necessary  to  trace  first  the  historical  tableau  of  the  times  in  which 
he  happened  to  live.  A  mere  outline  of  the  salient  features  of  the 
political,  social,  and  intellectual  conditions  of  Italy  while  Kosmini 
was  alive  will  answer  our  purpose. 

In  addition,  it  is  of  great  importance  to  portray  his  personality, 
namely,  his  psychological  dispositions,  the  motive  which  controlled 
his  mental  activity,  his  philosophical  method,  and  the  attitude  he 
assumed  towards  the  problems  Italy  confronted  at  that  very  time. 
After  stating  the  historical  and  psychological  factors  of  Eosmini's 
philosophy,  I  deem  it  important  to  give,  as  an  introductory  basis 
of  his  ethical  teaching,  a  short  survey  of  the  fundamental  principle 
of  his  philosophy,  for  he  was  convinced  that  ethics  is  dependent  upon 
metaphysics. 

The  introductory  study  of  the  first  part  will  present  Eosmini's 
philosophical  endeavors  in  the  historical  light,  and  will  enable  us  to 
understand  and  appreciate  the  essential  features  of  his  ethical  theory, 
which  will  form  the  core  of  the  investigation  and  the  subject-matter 
of  the  second  part  of  the  present  study.  Finally,  after  stating  what 
the  Italian  philosopher  contributed  to  the  manifold  stock  of  ethical 
theories,  our  interest  will  center  upon  the  affinity  that  Eosmini's 
ethical  principles  seem  to  have  with  those  of  precedent  philosophers. 


PART  I 

THE    FACTORS   OF   ROSMINI'S   PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  I 
lIiSTOiiicAL  Situation  of  Rosmini's  Italy 

1.    SocicU  and  Political  Conditions 

The  period  of  Rosmini's  life  was  characterized  by  political  and 
social  disturbance.^ 

Italy  was  kept  in  slavery  by  foreign  rulers.  Unexpected  events, 
however,  {rradually  concurred,  from  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century  forward,  to  awake  her  dormant  will.  The  invigorating 
breath  of  political  liberty  which  came  from  England,  as  well  as  the 
French  humanitarian  ideas  which  were  spread  all  over  Europe, 
stimulated  some  leaders  of  absolute  government  to  give  Italy  the  first 
impulse  to  a  peaceful  social  and  economic  evolution.  Thus,  the 
French  Revolution,  which  broke  out  contemporaneously  with  this 
movement,  .seemed  there,  at  its  beginning,  to  be  a  violent  and  dis- 
turbing phenomenon.     The  republican  armies  crossed  the  Alps,  ap- 

1  Antonio  Rosmini-Scrbati  (1797-1855)  was  horn  at  Rovereto,  in  the  Italian 
Tyrol,  of  noble  and  rich  parents.  He  spent  his  bovhood  and  youth  in  an  at- 
mosphere of  religion  and  study.  In  1821  he  entered  the  priesthood.  He  devoted 
most  of  his  life  to  philosophical  investigations  and  to  a  religious  society  which 
he  foumled,  having  as  purpose  the  promotion  of  corporeal,  intellectual,  and 
spiritual  works  of  Christian  charity.  In  1848  the  philosopher  Gioberti,  at  that 
time  minister  of  the  king  Charles  Albert,  trusted  our  philosopher  with  the 
mission  of  inducing  the  Pope  to  be  the  chief  of  the  desired  Italian  confedera- 
tion. Rosmini  undertook  it  as  he  was  convinced  that  such  a  confederation  could 
be  the  salvation  of  Italy  and  of  the  Church.  But  the  precipitation  of  political 
events  and  the  entourage  of  Pius  IX  prevented  the  accomplishment  of  Ros- 
mini's diplomatic  mission. 

Indc  irac!  He  began  to  be  suspected  of  liberalism,  which  at  that  time  in 
Italy  meant  patriotism,  and  his  philosophy  liegan  to  be  the  ol)ject  of  persistent 
persecutions.  He,  however,  underwent  them,  like  Socrates,  with  the  grandeur  of 
mind  of  a  genuine  philosopher.  Penally,  he  went,  weary  and  disappointed,  to 
seek  rest  and  oblivion  in  the  charming  solitude  of  Stresa,  near  the  Lago  M^ag- 
giore.  There  the  ^'lite  of  the  learned  men  of  Italy  and  Europe,  as  Cardinal  New- 
man, Cardinal  Wiseman,  Lacordaire,  Manzoni,  Bonghi,  anil  some  others,  met 
together  to  comfort  the  good  and  afflicted  heart  of  the  great  Italian  philosopher. 

3 


4  FiOSMINI'S  CONTBIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPEY 

parently  induced  by  the  desire  to  redeem  Italy,  but  the  outcome  of 
their  invasion  proved  to  be  in  open  contradiction  with  the  principles 
of  social  and  international  justice,  which  were  heralded  by  them  with 
the  bold  and  steady  conviction  that  they  corresponded  to  the  uni- 
versal needs  and  demands  of  the  civilized  world.  They  did  not  bring, 
indeed,  any  remedy  to  Italy  and  only  sought  material  profit ;  but 
they  proclaimed  there  new  social  ideas,  which  aimed  at  the  radical 
destruction  of  the  whole  edifice  of  the  old  regime,  as  well  as  at  the 
organization  of  a  new  life. 

Their  social  gospel  regarded  all  men  as  equal  and  free  and  all 
nations  as  mistresses  of  their  own  destinies.  Accordingly,  each  na- 
tion was  suggested  to  unite  its  parcelled  parties  and  to  form  a  single 
and  independent  state.  Such  notions,  promising  universal  revival, 
did  not  fail  to  make  wonderful  and  rapid  strides  all  over  Europe, 
while  they  urged  in  Italy  the  development  of  analogus  thoughts  and 
feelings,  which  were  carefully  disguised  with  literary  forms.  But 
the  new  principles  of  uniform,  civil  organization  which  Napoleon  I. 
laid  down,  gave  the  Italians  the  most  powerful  impulse  to  their  na- 
tional solidarity.  He  abolished  pernicious  privileges  all  over  the 
peninsula.  Establishing  a  strictly  laical  authority,  he  inhibited  the 
influence  of  clericalism  or  the  religious-factionary  control  over  public 
education  and  intellectual  life.  He  ended  municipal  jealousies,  local 
prejudices,  and  ancient  crystallized  traditions.  Introducing  a  civil 
and  penal  code,  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  the  Roman  Law  and 
of  universal  equality,  he  supplanted  conflicting  customs  and  juris- 
dictions. By  the  equal  and  regular  administration  of  justice,  he 
overthrew  the  confused  and  fixed  forms  of  government,  of  the  tenure 
of  land,  and  of  the  whole  structure  of  the  Italian  society,  which 
was  based  upon  feudalism.  All  those  changes,  as  well  as  the  system 
of  military  recruiting,  and  the  construction  of  new  roads  and  bridges, 
greatly  contributed  to  unite  the  minds  and  hearts  of  all  Italians. 
Besides,  the  monuments  which  were  erected  to  perpetuate  the  mem- 
ory of  the  most  glorious  events  and  of  the  greatest  men,  and,  above 
all,  the  ambition  of  Napoleon  to  embody  the  greatness  of  the  Roman 
empire,  as  the  Pope,  the  German  emperor,  the  men  of  the  Renais- 
sance, and  the  glorious  Italian  republics  had  endeavored  to  do  before 
him,  could  not  fail  to  display  the  beauty  of  the  deliverance  and  unity 
of  Italy.2 

But,  after  Napoleon's  downfall,  the  whole  peninsula  and  the 
islands  which  crown  it,  were  thrown  again  by  the  congress  of  Vienna 
into  the  same  abject  condition  in  which  they  were  before.  They 
were  once  more  morcellated  in  small  sovereign  states,  which  were 

2  See  "Les  Resurrections  Italiennes,"  by  H.  Berenger,  E.  Pelletan,  Ed., 
Paris,  1911. 


niSTOEICAL  SITUATION  OF  rOSMIXI'S   ITALY  6 

enthralled  by  the  despotic  control  of  Austria.     Tradition  and  ab- 
solutism were  revived  by  the  triumphant  reaction. 

Napoleon's  rule  was  reg:arded  as  an  illejral  attempt  ap:ainst  order, 
and  all  his  activity  as  propagation  of  revolution.  According^ly, 
social  order  was  thought  again  to  be  a  natural  emanation  from  abso- 
lute government.  Legislation  began  to  be  directed  to  check  pro- 
gressive tendencies  and  every  form  of  revolutioiuiry  aspirations. 
Divine  right  began  to  bo  opposed  to  natural  right,  legitimacy  to  popu- 
lar sovereignty,  the  state  to  the  individual,  authority  to  liberty. 
The  clergy  resumed  its  influence  upon  education,  the  censorship  of 
the  press,  and  .some  other  offices  which  gave  it  control  of  intellectual 
and  moral  life.  But  the  Italy  of  1815  was  no  more  the  Italy  of  the 
ante-Napoleonic  period.  The  "geographic  expression"  was  no  more 
quiescent  and  inert ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  permeated  with  a  spirit 
of  rebellion  and  progress.  The  stream  of  new  ideas  which  had  been 
brought  into  the  oppressed  country  from  the  other  nations,  whose 
barriere  had  been  already  overthrown  by  the  French  wars,  could  be 
checked  no  more.  The  ferment  within  the  stirred  minds  was  power- 
ful and  pregnant  with  hopes  of  bright  future. 

The  emancipation,  the  unity,  and  the  greatness  of  Italy  was 
already  the  magnificent  ideal  which  focused  all  the  energies  and  the 
heroic  efforts  of  the  best  Italians;  to  it  everything  was  devoted  and 
subordinated. 

Austria,  meanwhile,  in  her  hatred,  stopped  at  no  outrage,  at  no 
absurdity.  She  began  to  see  conspiracy  and  revolution  in  ever>i:hing 
and  everywhere,  and  to  suppress  all  feelings  of  patriotism  and  lib- 
erty in  the  whole  peninsula.  Accordingly,  men  of  elevated  mind 
were  thrown  into  dungeons,  or  were  wrenched  out  of  their  beloved 
country  and  exiled.  And  they,  guilty  only  of  patriotic  love,  wan- 
dered about  over  those  countries,  in  which  liberty  was  flourishing, 
and  spread  the  sad  news  of  their  national  distress.  But  Metter- 
nich's  policy  failed  to  extingui.sh  the  fire  of  rebellion  which  seemed 
to  be  smothered  beneath  the  peaceful  aspect  of  the  Italian  penin- 
sula, though  it  still  raged,  like  the  lava  under  the  picturesque  sides 
of  its  volcanoes.  Under  the  pressure  of  the  persistent  and  brutal 
reaction  and  of  the  .sad  common  experience,  the  vision  of  the  na- 
tional ideal  became  more  distinct  and  suggestive  than  before.  The 
Italian  people  strained  its  powers  and  brought  all  its  possibilities  to 
its  richest  unfolding.  The  oi)prossc(l  minds  seemed  to  be  revived  and 
inspired  by  the  spirit  of  the  Renaissance,  which  conveyed  the  sug- 
gestion that  human  personality  is  the  source  of  all  activities  and 
achievements.  In  every  province  of  life  there  was  a  momentous 
awakening.  The  life  of  the  Italian  race  reached  the  moment  of  ex- 
pcrimcntum  crucis.     Now  the  problem  upon  which  the  universal  in- 


6  SOSMINI'S  CONTEIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  FHIL0S0PE7 

terest  focused  was  not  merely  the  emancipation  and  unity  of  Italy, 
but  the  future  of  her  culture  and  civilization,  in  harmony  with  the 
spirit  of  her  glorious  traditions,  which  was  threatened  by  her  tyran- 
nical rulers.  So  \dtal  a  problem  evoked  and  concentrated  all  social 
and  intellectual  forces.  It  was  a  moment  of  great  unrest  and  of  in- 
tense elaboration  of  means  and  schemes.  From  the  powerful  fermen- 
tation of  ideas  three  main  currents  of  thought  emerged  for  the  sal- 
vation of  the  country.  Men  of  different  mental  attitudes  agreed 
in  the  diagnosis  of  the  unbearable  conditions  of  Italy;  they  were 
all  determined  not  to  sit  upon  her  ruins  and  weep  and  lament  like 
Jeremiah.  But  they  were  united  in  the  common  desire  of  driving 
away  the  hated  foreigner,  who  was  recognized  as  the  sole  cause  of 
the  distress  of  their  beloved  country.  They  were,  however,  divided 
in  regard  to  the  means  to  be  used  and  to  the  method  of  organizing 
the  new  Italy.  Some  put  their  hope  in  the  house  of  Savoy.  Others 
thought  to  have  found  the  panacea  of  all  evils  in  a  confederation  of 
all  the  Italian  states  with  the  Pope  as  its  chief.  Such  a  plan  was 
the  outcome  of  two  main  factors.  The  congress  of  Vienna  and  the 
general  tendency  of  minds  in  all  Europe,  permeated  by  the  roman- 
tic spirit,  called  out  the  revival  of  Catholicism.  In  Italy,  many 
learned  men  who  did  not  wish  to  part  asunder  their  love  of  the 
Church  and  their  love  of  country  were  fascinated  by  the  memory 
of  the  medieval  commonwealths  which  were  united  ander  the  pro- 
tecting power  of  the  Pope. 

Besides,  convinced  that  the  unity  of  Italy  could  not  be  achieved 
by  revolution,  they  advocated  the  conciliation  of  all  forces  and  ele- 
ments, of  papacy  and  monarchy,  of  liberty  and  civil  progress,  as 
the  most  effective  method  of  national  regeneration  and  organization. 

Mazzini's  "Young  Italy"  stood  in  opposition  to  the  other  par- 
ties. He  urged  the  Italians  to  join  his  association  *'in  the  firm  in- 
tent of  consecrating  both  thought  and  action  to  the  great  aim  of  re- 
constructing Italy  as  one  independent  sovereign  nation  of  free  men 
and  equals."  Education  and  insurrection  were  the  means  he  sug- 
gested. But,  beyond  his  own  country,  he  looked  to  mankind.  The 
idea  of  nationality  was,  according  to  him,  the  necessary  lever  for 
the  realization  of  the  cosmopolitan  ideal  of  an  international  revo- 
lution and  republic. 

With  the  ascent  of  Pius  IX.  to  the  throne  of  St.  Peter,  the  con- 
ciliatory tendency  seemed  to  prevail  over  the  others.  "Wliile  through 
all  Europe  liberalism  and  reaction  were  still  in  conflict,  the  election 
of  such  a  Pope  seemed  to  be  a  tribute  to  the  national  feeling  of  the 
Italians.  The  head  of  the  Church,  usually  reproached  with  com- 
plicity in  reviving  what  was  already  dead,  and  in  killing  what  was 
quite  alive,  showed  that  he  appreciated  indeed  patriotism,  which 


niSTOEICAL  SITUATION  OF  EOSMIXI'S  ITALY  7 

was  still  resrarcled  as  a  crime  and  condomned  by  the  Austrian  bishops 
as  the  work  of  the  devil.  Tiie  Pope's  liberal  tendencies  could  not 
fail  to  foster  the  kindled  tlame  of  patriotic  love  and  to  unite  all 
the  Italians  in  the  common  purpose.  Their  enthusiasm  culminated 
in  a  general  cry  for  war  ajxainst  the  oppressing  foreigner.  During 
those  momentous  days,  for  the  firet  time  in  the  history  of  civilized 
countries,  Plato's  ideal  form  of  government  seemed  to  be  realized  in 
some  aspects;  the  political  attitude,  under  the  pressure  of  circum- 
stances, became  quite  philosophical. 

Rosmini,  Gioberti.  Mamiani.  the  most  prominent  leaders  in  the 
movement  of  thought,  forgot  their  philosophical  controversies  which 
had  hitherto  divided  them,  and  devoted  their  common  efforts  to  the 
interest  of  their  country.  Gioberti  sent  our  philosopher  to  Rome 
as  ambassador  of  Piedmont  to  induce  the  Pope,  whose  constitutional 
minister  was  Mamiani,  to  take  part  in  the  war  against  Austria  and 
to  establish  the  basis  of  an  Italian  confederation.  But  Rosmini's 
mission  failed,  because  of  the  reaction  which  once  more  prevailed 
all  over  Italy.  Both  the  method  of  revolutionary  action  and  of  the 
impossible  idealistic  confederation,  however,  which  proved  to  bo  only 
factors  of  bitter  and  general  disappointment,  were  replaced  by 
Cavour's  diplomacy.  He  cleverly  broke  the  dream  of  a  reconcilia- 
tion which  was  based  upon  impossible  compromises  of  principles, 
tendencies,  and  attitudes,  profoundly  diverse,  and  gave  the  na- 
tional party  a  new  direction  based  upon  reciprocal  liberty  of  state 
and  religion.  He  thus  initiated  the  achievement  of  the  political 
sjTithesis  of  the  new  Italy,  free,  independent,  and  united,  as  she 
was  wished  to  be  by  her  sons  and  by  the  learned  abroad.  But  Ros- 
mini  had  not  the  joy  of  seeing  the  final  phase  of  so  long  and  so  epic 
a  struggle,  to  which  he  had  devoted  his  manifold  activity,  his 
health,  and  reputation. 

2.  Intellectual  Conditions 

The  powerful  politit-al  action  which  the  Italians  displayed  for 
the  radical  reconstruction  of  their  country  was  in  intimate  and  or- 
ganic connection  with  the  unfolding  of  their  mental  forces. 

An  action  so  complex  and  of  such  high  practical  importance 
could  not  fail  to  focus  the  general  attention  and  provoke  reflective 
thought.  It  involved,  indeed,  the  necessity  of  criticizing  the  old  and 
of  developing  a  new  intellectual  life.  The  possi])ility  of  its  succes.s- 
ful  issues  depended  upon  changing  hal)its  of  mind,  modes  of  indi- 
vidual condur-t.  and  forms  of  social  life.  It  had  to  l)e  justified  and 
strengtlicncd  with  theoretical  demonstrations  of  its  justice  and  of  its 
conformity  with  the  principles  of  human  nature  and  of  modern 
thought. 


8  SOSMINI'S  CONTEIBVTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Besides,  the  new  ideas,  the  new  scientific  principles,  which  had 
to  be  the  determining  and  controlling  factors  of  the  national  think- 
ing and  willing,  could  not  but  be  clothed  with  abstract  forms,  be- 
cause only  such  forms  could  escape  political  censure.  The  mag- 
nificent and  promising  mental  activity  of  the  Renaissance,  which 
had  made  Italy  the  cradle  of  modern  thought,  was  followed  by  two 
centuries  of  intellectual  tyranny  and  slumber.  The  religious  reac- 
tion and  the  deadening  influence  of  Spanish  bigotry  had  endeavored 
to  check  the  new  stream  of  free  and  independent  thought,  and  to 
paralyze  the  germs  of  a  new  life. 

But  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Italy  was  again  ani- 
mated by  the  spirit  of  Dante  and  the  Renaissance,  and  emerged 
from  her  long  intellectual  depression  and  lassitude.  She  entered 
then  into  the  general  movement  of  modern  thought,  to  which  she 
had  already  given  the  very  first  vital  impetus. 

It  was  natural  that  the  Italians  should  feel  impelled,  while  under 
the  hated  foreign  j^oke,  to  concentrate  all  their  mental  activities 
upon  the  reconstruction  of  their  coimtry,  like  the  prisoners  who, 
groaning  under  the  weight  of  chains,  long  for  liberty  and  concen- 
trate all  their  efforts  upon  attaining  it.  The  Italians  indeed  began 
to  keep  thought  and  action  in  persistent  unity,  until  their  patriotic 
hopes  and  struggles  were  crowned  with  success.  Accordingly,  since 
that  very  time,  they  began  to  display  the  same  eager  desire,  the 
same  method,  to  vindicate,  to  magnify,  and  to  convert  all  the  mem- 
ories of  their  glorious  past  into  a  living  motor  force.  They  endeav- 
ored, impelled  by  a  feeling  of  national  pride,  to  restore  the  value 
of  their  culture,  and  to  impress  a  national  mark  upon  politics,  art, 
literature,  and  philosophy.  They  did  not  fail,  however,  to  throw 
open  their  minds  and  hearts  to  all  the  invigorating  influence  which 
came  to  them  from  foreign  countries.  They  became,  under  the 
pressure  of  their  awful  experiences,  more  sensible  to  the  beauty  and 
wealth  of  thought,  ancient  as  well  as  modern,  which  was  contained 
cither  in  foreign  literatures,  full  already  of  juvenile  vigor,  or  in 
their  own.  The  function  of  literature  and  art  became  civil  and  pa- 
triotic. Lyric  and  dramatic  poetry  assumed  an  aggressive  attitude 
against  the  evils  which  the  country  had  so  long  endured.  Tragedies 
were  more  or  less  disguised  battles  against  any  kind  of  despotism 
and  tyranny ;  they  aimed  to  stimulate  national  feeling  by  revealing 
upon  the  stage  past  injustices,  by  exalting  deeds  of  national  heroism, 
and  by  reviving  Roman  ideas  of  liberty,  of  justice,  and  of  respect 
for  human  dignity.  Satiric  poetry  took  on  a  social  and  civil  signifi- 
cance ;  it  was  an  embellished  protest  against  the  excessive  inequality 
between  the  rich  and  the  poor,  and  a  defense  of  the  people  trampled 
and  dejected.     Painting  and  sculpture  revived  and  embodied  what 


HISTORICAL  SITUATION  OF  UOSillXI'S   ITALY  9 

could  foster  the  consciousness  of  greatness.  Music,  throufjii  its  sug- 
gestive and  universal  language,  displayed  the  anguish  and  the  hopes 
of  all  Italians.  They  made  historical  researches,  not  for  the  sake 
of  curiosity,  but  because  they  were  an.xious  to  indicate  the  factors 
of  their  national  misfortune,  and  to  finil  in  tiie  past  the  flame  of 
enthusiasm  and  the  experiences  of  their  ancestors,  which  could  be 
translated  into  working  forces. 

The  very  dawn  of  the  new  intellectual  life  was,  indeed,  charac- 
terized by  the  critical  examination  of  the  ideas  they  found  current 
and  by  a  great  interest  in  knowledge.  Knowledge  began  to  be  regarded 
as  a  social  power  and  as  determining  factor  in  the  movement  of  na- 
tional regeneration.  They  nuide  scientific  investigations  to  find 
useful  truths,  to  modify,  through  experimental  methods,  mental 
Imbits,  and  thus  to  divert  men  from  the  frivolous  life  of  the  time 
and  to  bring  them  to  serious  reflection.  Through  inner  regenera- 
tion, through  a  peaceful  and  normal  intellectual  evolution,  through 
a  national  unity  of  mental  life,  they  wanted  to  change  the  distress- 
ing conditions  of  the  country.  Thus  the  motive,  which  began  to 
control  the  evolution  of  the  new  intellectual  life,  was  quite  practical 
and  determined  scientific  work.  From  the  beginning,  the  reflection 
upon  the  ideas  which  permeated  social  and  individual  life  could 
afford  no  satisfaction.  The  common  experience  of  pu])lic  life  could 
not  fail  to  focus  the  attention  of  all  upon  civil  laws.  These  were 
said  to  be  an  emanation  from  the  invisible  and  eternal  will,  but 
proved  to  be  the  outcome  of  the  deification  of  crystallized  truths, 
of  hereditary  prejudices,  and  of  changeless  oppressive  political  sys- 
tems, as  well  as  the  genuine  work  of  the  personal  interest  of  rulers. 
Such  laws  were  of  no  public  advantage,  they  did  not  satisfy  any 
practical  need  or  demand;  nay,  they  were  factors  in  the  national 
oppression  and  general  unhappiness.     Accordingly,  accommodation  I' 

to  them  seemed  to  be  cowartUy  and  shameful.  Wavering  confidence 
in  the  practical  value  of  obedience  to  them  inevitably  and  fatally 
implied  an  attack  upon  the  validity  of  their  ground.  The  .same  po- 
litical situation  was  bound  to  undermine  also  the  })rineiples  of  moral- 
ity, which  controlled  individual  conduct  and  required  the  subser- 
vience to  tyrannical  laws  and  systems. 

These  laws  were  based  no  less  upon  tradition  tliaii  authority,  and 
thus  they  seemed  also  to  perpetuate  the  unhappy  conditions  of  the 
country.  Many  factors  happened  to  subserve  the  critical  and  de- 
structive attitude  the  Italians  assumed  while  confronting  the  polit- 
ical problem,  which  involved  their  iiidividual  and  social  happine.s.s. 
Authority  more  and  more  lost  respect,  because  it  was  regarded  as 
oppressive.     Tradition  lost  the  influence  it  had  exerted  upon  the 


10  EOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

national  mind,  because  it  suggested  always  changeless  forms  of  im- 
possible life. 

Religious  feeling  wavered  because  the  Church  in  Italy  was,  at 
that  time,  identified  in  the  mind  of  the  people  with  the  prevailing 
political  tyranny.  And  finally  the  contact  with  French  culture 
permeated  with  revolutionary  ideas  contributed  also  to  foster  the 
feeling  of  rebellion  against  the  old  standards  of  life  and  fossilized 
beliefs. 

The  outcome  of  such  great  fermentation  of  new  ideas  was  moral 
disintegration,  political  unrest,  and  skepticism.  The  pressure  of 
political  activity  which  imposed  profound  intellectual  revolutions 
did  not  make  skepticism  merry,  as  in  France  during  the  eighteenth 
century,  but  anxious  to  reconstruct  knowledge,  already  regarded  as 
a  great  dynamic  agency  in  the  political  regeneration  of  Italy.  The 
emphasis,  however,  upon  the  practical  significance  of  knowledge 
made  u'^cessary  critical  insight  into  its  origin  and  nature.  Political 
action  r-xiuired  a  philosophical  background. 

Whence  the  crucial  question  rose  whether  experience  or  the  mind 
had  to  be  held  as  the  source  of  knowledge  and  consequently  of  ideas, 
which  are  its  constituent  elements;  whether  ideas  had  to  be  consid- 
ered as  innate  or  as  the  product  of  sensations.  This  problem  was 
regarded,  in  Italy  as  well  as  throughout  Europe,  at  that  time,  as 
the  most  fundamental  problem,  and  was  justly  placed  in  the  fore- 
ground of  philosophical  discussion.  For  its  solution  had  to  furnish 
the  basis  of  moral  and  political  sciences  which  were  expected  to  en- 
lighten and  sustain  the  national  movement.  In  fact,  the  innate- 
ness  of  ideas  meant  the  previous  existence  of  a  priori  controlling 
principles.  Accordingly,  the  national  thinking  and  will,  knowledge 
and  action,  had  to  be  controlled  by  abstract,  eternal,  and  crystal- 
lized notions,  as  during  the  long  years  of  unchanged  slavery.  Ideals 
and  laws  had  to  be  regarded  as  eternally  given,  and  consequently 
there  was  no  hope  of  reference  to  the  concrete  conditions,  of  po- 
litical change,  freedom,  and  progress. 

On  the  contrary,  the  belief  that  ideas  were  the  outcome  of  ever- 
changing  personal  experience  involved  the  conviction  that  human 
personality  must  have  a  conscious  participation  in  the  creation  of 
truths,  ideals,  and  laws,  with  absolute  independence  of  every  exter- 
nal authority.  Thus  the  individual,  reckoning  the  changed  condi- 
tion, was  able  to  direct  his  own  conduct  and  become  a  decisive  factor 
in  the  regeneration  and  reconstruction  of  Italy.  The  philosophy 
of  experience  which  based  knowledge  and  morality  solely  upon  per- 
ception, proclaimed  the  right  of  individualism  and  of  rebellion 
against  intellectual  and  political  oppression  as  well  as  against  every 
form  of  despotism,  and  thus  it  best  responded  to  the  urgent  needs 


HISTORICAL  SITUATION  OF  ROSMINI'S  ITALY  H 

and  demands  of  the  second  half  of  the  eighteentli  eentnry  and  of 
the  early  part  of  the  nineteenth  t-entiiry.  Of  course,  the  interest  in 
the  experimental  and  positive  sciences,  the  closer  contact  with  the 
En«;lish  and  French  literatures  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  mod- 
ern philosophy,  the  loosened  respect  for  tradition,  the  declinint?  in- 
fluence of  the  Church,  the  decreased  feelinf;  of  tiie  supernatural, 
the  conviction,  also,  that  idealism,  allied  with  relifjious  and  civil 
authority,  was  an  instrument  of  reaction,  but,  above  all,  the  per- 
sonal presence  of  Condillac,^  were  so  many  factors  which  contributed 
to  condition  and  assure  the  prevalence  of  empiricism  in  Italy. 

Gerdil,^  indeed,  endeavored  to  oppose  to  it  a  foi-m  of  idealism 
permeated  with  the  doctrines  of  Plato,  St.  Augustine,  and  Descartes, 
but  his  efforts  were  frustrated  by  the  practical  significance  and  com- 
promise of  idealism,  holding  fixed,  innate  controlling  principles  of 
individual  and  social  ethics,  and  by  the  rapid  translation  of  Con- 
dillac's  works  as  well  as  by  the  teaching  of  Soave,  who  followed  and 
exalted  Locke  as  the  greatest  metaphysician  since  he  had  dared 
"to  destroy  the  chimera  of  innate  ideas. "^ 

Colleges  and  universities  welcomed  the  new  philosophy,  because 
it  seemed  to  answer  the  pressing  political  purpose  of  that  historical 
moment  and  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  intellectual  temper  and 
with  the  history  of  the  philosophical  thought  of  the  Italians." 

Art  and  literature  endeavored  to  assimilate  and  apply  its  prin- 
ciples which,  spread  in  diluted  form,  could  not  fail  to  filter  through 
the  strata  of  national  consciousness  and  conduct." 

The  fact  that  Condillac  and  Soave  were  priests,  and  that  the 

3  Condillac  lived  ten  years  (1758-1768)  in  Parma,  at  that  time  the  "  reticles- 
vous"  of  the  best  intelligences,  as  tutor  of  the  young  Due  Ferdinand  of  Bourbon. 

••  Sigismond  Car<l.  Gerdil  (1718-1802)  published  a  great  number  of  philo- 
sophical works  in  French,  Italian,  and  Latin.  See  Bouillicr,  "  Ilistoire  de  la 
philosophic  cartesienne,"  t.  11..  ch.  XXVIII.;  Ueberweg's  "Hist,  of  Phil.,"  Vol. 
II.,  page  480. 

5  Soave  translated  into  Italian  first  Dr.  Winne's  summary  of  Locke's  cele- 
brated "Essay,"  and  later  published  a  complete  translation  in  the  "Collezione 
dei  Clasgici  Metafisici"  in  Pavia  (1819).  His  * '  Istituzioni  di  Logica,  Metafisica 
e  Morale"  was  useil  as  a  text-book  of  philosophy  in  many  colleges.  He  was 
professor  of  philosophy  in  the  Brera  college  in  Milan.  Let  us  notii-e  here  that 
he,  like  Condillac,  was  a  catholic  priest. 

«  What  is  the  national  characteristic  of  Italian  philosophy?  According  to 
Ferri  ("Essai  sur  I'Histoire  de  la  Philosophic  en  Italic  au  Di.xXeuviftme  Siftcle, " 
Vol.  II.,  page  343),  the  Italian  miml,  although  fonil  of  experience  and  life,  has 
manifested  a  tendency  to  idealism;  according  to  P.  Ragnisco  (Rivista  di  Filo- 
Sofia,  Vol.  3,  1911,  page  698)  the  proper  characteristic  of  Italian  philosophy 
is  naturalism. 

~  Foscolo,  Leopardi,  Giordani.  Count  L.  Cicognara  ("Del  Bello"),  Cesarottl 
("Saggio  sulla  filosofia  deile  liiigue"),  Costa  ("  Del  modo  <li  comporre  le  idee"), 
anil  some  others  wrote  under  the  influence  of  the  new  philosophy. 


12  EOSMINI'S  CONTBIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Jesuit  order,  whose  influence  was  so  powerful,  strongly  favored 
the  imported  philosophy,  helped  its  rapid  spread.  It  was  thought 
that  faith  and  ethics  would  not  be  affected  by  the  principles  of  em- 
piricism. Strange  irony  of  history!  The  most  striking  charac- 
teristics of  the  empirical  movement  in  England,  where  it  was  born, 
as  well  as  in  France,  where  it  had  been  imported  by  such  men  as 
Montesquieu  and  Voltaire,  were  disregard  for  positive  religion  and 
opposition  to  the  traditional  beliefs  presented  to  individuals  through 
the  medium  of  organized  society.  The  antagonism  to  innate  ideas 
meant  opposition 'to  the  blind,  undiscussed  reception  of  old  ideas, 
and  eager  desire  for  independent  critical  examination.  Besides, 
the  theory  of  transformed  sensations  assumed  the  denial  of  every 
authority,  either  religious  or  political,  leaving  conventions  and  facts 
depending  upon  man's  imagination  and  will.  But  the  new  theory 
seemed  to  be  in  Italy  an  auxiliary,  practical  standpoint  and  a  pro- 
visional method  for  political  activity  rather  than  a  fixed  and  definite 
philosophical  position.  The  evolving  of  political  conditions  gradu- 
ally modified  the  strict  empiristic  attitude.  The  most  prominent 
philosophers  preceding  Rosmini,  as  Gioja,  Romagnosi,  and  Galluppi, 
although  contemporary,  formed  a  rhythmic  movement  of  philosoph- 
ical thought.  They  lacked  the  originality  and  boldness  which  had 
characterized  the  Italian  philosophy  of  the  Renaissance,  and  neg- 
lected the  fresh  thought  of  the  great  Vico,  who  was  ''the  nine- 
teenth century  in  germ,"^  but  displayed  the  same  enthusiasm  for 
the  new  philosophy  of  experience.  They  were  permeated  with  the 
spirit  of  the  Enlightenment,  and  their  main  interest  was  accord- 
ingly in  the  problem  of  knowledge  and  in  the  organization  of  a  just 
social  order.  Thus  philosophy  came  to  be  regarded,  as  amongst 
the  ancient  Greeks,  as  a  social  power,  as  a  determining  factor  in 
political  reconstruction,  and  dependent  upon  the  demands  of  prac- 
tical, and  in  particular,  of  political  life.  It  assumed,  then,  an  es- 
sentially human  direction  and  its  original  mission.** 

They  all  betrayed,  however,  the  same  aversion  for  the  violent 
breaking  from  religious  tradition  as  well  as  the  same  fear  of  the 
moral  consequences  which  could  be  inferred  from  the  current  philos- 
ophy: whence  the  same  preoccupation  we  find  in  all  for  reconcilia- 
tion, the  same  endeavor  to  fuse  together  the  two  great  streams  of 
thought  which  derived  from  England  and  France,  and  to  harmon- 
ize, even  in  spite  of  patent  inconsistency,  idealism  and  empiricism 
or  sensationalism,  Descartes  and  Locke  or  Condillac. 

8  See  B.  Croce,  "La  Filisofia  di  G.  Vico,"  page  248,  Bari,  G.  Laterza,  1911. 
English  translation  by  R.  G.  CoUingwood. 

9  Windelband,  "History  of  Philosophy,"  page  6S;  Dewey,  "Essays,"  p.  21. 


EISTOTxlCAL  SITUATION  OF  liOSMIM'S  ITALY  13 

According  to  Gioja/*'  the  fune'tioii  of  philosopliy  is  to  rule  the 
■whole  of  human  activity  for  the  sake  of  universal  happiness.  Ac- 
cortliufjly,  he  thouglit  that  its  business  was  the  defence  of  human 
rights  and  the  promotion  of  social  wealth  and  the  control  of  social 
ethics,  which  involves  hygiene,  politeness,  and  intellectual  educa- 
tion. He  relatetl  all  inner  phenomena  to  sensations,  and  sensations 
to  the  senses.  But  he  recognized  within  us  a  certain  inner  aetivity 
which  he  called  "the  moving  force  of  the  soi\l";  this  is  the  source 
of  all  changes,  either  internal  or  external. 

Romagnosi*'  thought  that  the  theory  of  empiricism  and  the 
theory  of  innate  ideas  could  be  reconciled  by  recognizing  within 
our  mind,  above  mere  sensation,  a  peeuliar  natural  ])()wer,  en- 
dowed with  an  activity  of  its  own.  whieh  he  called  "senso  logico." 
The  function  of  the  logical  sense  which  is  prior  to  the  affirma- 
tion and  negation  of  our  judgments,  is  to  perceive  in  sensation, 
in  the  world  of  phenomena,  the  supersensible  element,  the  ele- 
ment of  intelligibility  whieh  is  the  being  and  the  activity  of 
things  "Vessere  ed  il  fare  delle  cose."  Thus,  according  to  him, 
being  and  causality  only  are  intelligible  or  objects  of  our  under- 
standing. The  object  of  the  rational  sen.se  is  the  idea,  the  intel- 
ligible, the  being,  not  sensations,  which  only  furnish  our  mind  with 
occa.sions  to  exercise  its  logical  sense.  So  his  teaching  marked  an 
almo.st  complete  divorce  from  Locke  and  Condillac  and  a  definite 
step  in  a  transition  from  empiricism  to  idealism. 

Galluppi^-  assumed  a  different  philosophical  attitude  towards  the 
problems  which  the  pressure  of  political  conditions  and  the  general 
intelleetual  movement  of  Europe  brought  to  the  foreground  of  philo- 
sophical interest.  His  teaching  marked,  indeed,  a  very  important 
stage  in  the  movement  of  philosophical  thought  in  Italy.  For  he 
was  the  first  to  understand  and  welcome  the  revolution  brought 
into  philosophy  by  Kant,  and  to  awaken  the  minds  of  his  own  coun- 
trymen from  their  dogmatic  slumber  and  from  their  fond  attach- 
ment to  sen.sualism  or  rationalism  by  pointing  out  to  tliem  the 
necessity  of  critical  investigation.^^ 

1'^  Molchiorre-Gioja  (1707-1829).  See  Ucberweg,  "History  of  Philosophy," 
Vol.  ir..  pages  483—484;  Ferri,  Histoire  do  la  Philosoi)hic  en  Italic  au  XIX"" 
si^de, ' '  Vol.  I. 

11  G.  Domenico  Roniagnosi  (17G 1-1 8.3.5).  See  Ueberweg,  op.  cit.,  pages 
484-85.  Vol.  II.;   Ferri,  op.  cit..  Vol.  I. 

n  Baron  Pasquale  Galliippi  (1770-184fi).  See  Forri  an<l  Ueberweg,  op. 
cit.;  R.  Mariano,  "La  Philosophie  contemporaine  en  Italie,"  1868;  Palhori&s, 
"La  Th^orie  Id^logique  de  Galluppi,"  Paris,  Mean,  1908. 

>•'»  Kant's  philosophy  was  known  in  Italy  through  two  books  published  in 
French,  i.  c,  "Philosophie  do  Kant,  on  principcs  fondamcntaux  do  la  i>hilosophie 
transcendentale, "   par  Ch.    Villers,   Metz,   1801,   and   "  Essai   d'unc   exposition 


14  EOSMINI'S  CONTEIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

His  works  are  pervaded  by  both  conflicting  tendencies,  empiri- 
cistic  and  rationalistic.  He  aimed  at  the  reform  of  philosophy,  and 
accordingly  endeavored  to  correct  empiricism  and  Kantism,  but 
he  proved  to  be  unable  to  extricate  himself  entirely  from  both 
philosophies,  in  which  he  found  a  valuable  treasure  for  his  own 
elaboration. 

Knowledge  and  action,  according  to  him,  or  thought,  its  elements, 
functions,  and  value  for  truth  and  good,  are  the  main  subject- 
matter  of  philosophy.  He  was  aware  that  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge was  in  his  day  "the  object  of  meditation  in  all  Europe,"  and 
upon  this  problem  he  focused  his  attention.  Against  sensationalism 
he  held  that  the  mind  is  not  only  sensitive,  but  intelligent  and  reason- 
able, and  made  the  distinction  between  sense  and  intelligence,  sen- 
sation and  thought.  Against  Condillac  he  stated  that  our  mind  is 
something  more  than  a  mere  collection  of  internal  states;  that  it  is 
a  reality,  a  being,  a  substance,  endowed  with  the  power  of  analysis 
and  synthesi.s.  He  rejected  innate  ideas  in  the  sense  of  ideas  prior 
to  sensations  and  independent  of  all  experience,  but  he  accepted 
them  in  the  sense  of  natural  ideas,  or  ideas  for  whose  acquisition  we 
have  a  natural  disposition,  "una  virtualita  naturale."  Galluppi 
agreed  with  Kant  that  knowledge  is  a  combination  of  subjective  and 
objective  elements,  but  he  found  Kant's  form  and  matter  equally 
subjective,  and  hence  the  failure  to  solve  the  problem  of  knowledge. 
The  crucial  point  is  to  determine  what  is  objective  and  subjective  in 
knowledge.  We  find  objective  elements  only  in  the  immediate  con- 
tact of  the  self  with  reality  or  in  primitive  experience;  reflective 
experience  which  is  based  upon  ideal  sj'nthesis  is  the  outcome  of  the 
objective  elements  given  by  sensations  and  of  the  subjective  elements 
produced  by  the  mind  itself.  This  was  the  solution  which  Galluppi 
gave  the  great  problem  of  critical  philosophy.  His  teaching,  char- 
acterized by  simple  and  attractive  eloquence,  permeated  by  the 
principles  of  the  Kantian  and  of  the  Scottish  school,  and  involving 
the  suggestion  to  descend  from  theology  to  psychology,  from  nature 
to  humanity,  from  abstractions  to  facts,  provoked  a  great  interest 
in  philosophy  amongst  the  Italians,  and  seemed  to  the  national 
party  to  be  a  powerful  instrument  of  political  action  and  easy  to  be 
assimilated  by  the  people  because  stripped  of  the  obsolete  and  dry 
scholastic  form. 

But  during  the  time  of  his  teaching  important  new  political 
changes  which  affected  Italy  as  well  as  all  Europe,  brought  out 

succinte  de  la  critique  de  la  raison  pure  de  Kant,"  par  M.  Kinker,  traduit  du 
hollandais  par  J.  Le  Fr.,  Amsterdam,  1801.  The  first  Italian  translation  of  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  was  published  by  Mantovani,  in  1821  and  1822.  Galluppi 
examined  Kantian  philosophy  in  detail. 


HISTORICAL  SITUATIOX  OF  HOSMIM'S    ITALY  15 

ehaiifjes  of  intellectual  attitudi-.  Wlini  the  rovolutionarv  storm 
was  over,  a  reaction  was  inevitable.  Admiration  for  the  preceding 
intellectual  movement  changi:cd  to  aversion  and  iiatrcd.  Reason  was 
held  responsible  for  the  violence  done  to  political  ami  relipfious  ene- 
mies. "Philosophy"  was  blamed  for  the  general  unrest  and  dis- 
order. The  French  Revolution,  welcomed  at  the  beginning  as  a 
manifestation  of  reason  and  the  triumph  of  man,  stripped  of  re- 
ligious preoccupations,  culminated  in  excesses  of  bloody  violence. 
Its  issue  was  a  numifest  confession  of  impotence  for  constructive 
purposes  and  social  peace.  Empiricism  transformed  into  sen- 
sualism, naturalism  changed  into  materialism,  deism  degenerated 
into  atheism,  enthusiastic  morals  sunk  into  egoistic  morals,  proved 
to  be  unable  to  settle  the  questions  which  were  .so  closely  connected 
with  individual  and  social  happiness.  The  nations  of  Europe  wliose 
barriers  had  been  overthrown  amongst  the  vicissitudes  of  the  revolu- 
tionary wars  could  already  freely  communicate  with  one  another, 
fuse  together  their  ideas,  and  thus  participate  in  a  general  culture, 
but  they  longed  for  peace  and  order,  for  a  new  source  of  life,  and 
for  a  new  system  of  ideas  and  purpo.ses.  So  it  happened  that  the 
general  feeling  against  the  violences  and  destructions  of  the  Revo- 
lution, the  over-excitement  and  exhaustion  produced  by  sensualistie 
excesses,  the  impuissanee  of  the  rationalistic  and  materialistic 
"philosophism"  to  reform  society,  the  universal  eager  desire  of  a 
new  center  of  gravitation,  the  same  programme  of  the  "Holy  Al- 
liance" which  heralded  the  reconstruction  of  moral  order  and  the 
regeneration  of  the  political  .system  of  Europe  on  the  basis  of  Chris- 
tianity and  thus  the  revival  of  religion,  and  finally  the  triumphant 
return  of  the  Pope  to  Rome,  evoked  a  spiritualistic  reaction.  The 
romantic  movement  favored  the  revival  of  the  Christian  religion. 
For  it  appealed  to  spontaneity,  sensibility,  feeling,  emotion,  and  en- 
thusiasm which  are  the  main  religious  factors,  and  while  revelling 
in  the  vast  world  of  the  unknown  as  well  as  in  a  new  n>alm  of  mar- 
vels and  nw.steries,  it  evoked  the  Middle  Ages  in  which  Christianity 
and  papacy  had  predominated.  Besides,  the  satisfaction  of  estlietic 
feeling  which  the  dominant  religion  afforded,  the  romantic  concep- 
tion of  Christianity  as  perfectly  compatible  with  the  highest  intel- 
lectual culture,  contribiitcd  to  present  as  "ultimatum"  to  the  con- 
vulsed society  the  religion  against  which  the  revolutionary  fury  had 
been  directed. 

Thus,  "through  a  common  movement,"  says  Taine,  "along  the 
whole  line  of  human  thought,  causes  draw  back  into  an  abstract 
region,  where  philosophy  had  not  been  to  search  them  out  for  eighteen 
centuries.  Then  was  manifest  the  disea.se  of  the  age,  the  restless- 
ness of  Werther  and  Faust,  very  like  that  which  in  a  similar^jjijc^  .^^^^ 


i 


OK  THE  ' 


16  SOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ment  agitated  men  eighteen  centuries  ago:  I  mean,  discontent  with 
the  present,  the  vague  desire  of  a  higher  beauty,  and  an  ideal  hap- 
piness, the  painful  aspiration  for  the  infinite."^* 

But  then  arose  in  Italy  the  question  whether  or  not  the  whole 
heritage  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  to  be  rejected,  which  age  of 
Italian  history  had  to  be  copied ;  whether  the  genuine  greatness  of 
Italy  had  to  be  founded  on  the  revival  of  the  age  of  the  Roman 
Empire  and  the  Renaissance,  when  social  life  and  human  person- 
ality were  free  and  independent  of  supernatural  preoccupation, 
and  the  Italians  enjoyed  a  spiritual  unity  of  knowledge  and  will ; 
or  on  the  revival  of  the  Middle  Ages,  when  the  intimate  union  of 
Church  and  monarchy,  of  religion  and  authority,  of  faith  and  reason, 
of  theology  and  philosophy,  prevailed. 

Men  who  were  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  classicism  and  of  the 
eighteenth-century  culture,  took  the  former  alternative.  Those 
whose  enthusiasm  was  directed  towards  romanticism  wanted  the 
life  of  the  new  Italy  to  be  a  continuity  of  the  harmony  of  all  social 
forces.  They  displayed,  nevertheless,  great  sympathy  for  all  modern 
aspirations,  and  endeavored  to  subserve  their  national  cause  by 
spreading,  under  an  evangelical  disguise,  forbidden  ideas  of  liberty, 
patriotism,  and  universal  equality. 

The  conciliatory  tendency  was  bound  to  prevail,  under  the  pres- 
sure of  religious  and  national  enthusiasm.  Such  a  tendency,  to- 
gether with  the  influence  of  the  reactionary  and  theological,  and  of 
the  ps.ychologico-spiritualistic  movement  in  France,  and  the  power- 
ful impulse  from  Germany  to  construct  gigantic  systems  in  order 
to  have  a  comprehensive  view  of  spiritual  life,  could  not  fail  to  pro- 
voke in  Italy  a  philosophy  which,  by  an  encyclopedic  synthesis  should 
seek  to  unite  all  intellectual  efforts  for  the  sake  of  a  common  na- 
tional action.  The  genius  of  Rosmini  provided  the  needed  philo- 
sophical formula  of  universal  harmony,  source  of  truth,  and  moral- 
ity, of  reciprocal  respect  and  love,  of  social  justice  and  individual 
rights,  as  symbol  of  the  coming  national  unity. 

14  "History  of  English  Literature,"  Book  lY.,  €h.  I. 


CHAPTEK  U 
RosMLNi's  Person ALiTv 

1.  h'osmini's  Vsychological  Dispositions 

An  extraordinary  Imnfjcr  for  learning  associatod  with  a  powor- 
ful  inti'llifriMU'c.  ii  proiiduiiced  relipfious  tendency.  ;iii<l  a  deep  feel- 
ing of  sympathy  for  men  were  the  important  features  of  Rosmini's 
psyeholoprjeal  inlieritanee.  These  native  dispositions  were  devel- 
oped hy  the  social  environment  in  which  he  was  reared,  and  exerted 
a  constant  influence  on  his  mental  activity.  His  early  tuition  as 
well  as  his  acadiMuic  course  was  permeated  with  rt'li<rious  ideals. 
The  atmosphere  which  he  and  the  learned  men  with  whom  he  was 
in  continuous  intercourse  breathed  was  pervaded  hy  I'cligious  reac- 
tion against  the  movement  of  modern  thought,  regarded  as  the  main 
factor  of  social  disturbance.  Accordingly,  his  mind  did  not  escape 
hal)its  of  analogous  thinking,  feeling,  and  acting,  and  partaking 
of  the  prevailing  reactionary  aim  and  disposition  of  his  times  and 
cla.ss. 

The  silent,  beautiful  scenes  of  immensity  and  mystery  which  the 
snowy  Alps  display  provoked  the  eager  mind  of  the  young  Ros- 
mini  to  wonder  and  philosophy.  We  are  told,  indeed,  that  he  began 
very  early  to  incline  to  the  investigation  of  truth,  and  to  display  a 
striking  tendency  to  moralize.  While  he  was  a  boy.  playing  the 
game  of  "policeman."  or  "catch  thief,"  he  preferred  the  part  of 
judge  to  every  other,  for  he  liked  to  pose  as  a  "wise  man,"  and  to 
give  good  advice  to  his  little  friends. 

We  are  told  also  that  the  young  thinker  surpri.sed  his  tutor  with 
his  advanced  philosophiciil  knowledge.  Just  when  the  good  teacher 
judged  his  pupil  al)le  to  be  initiated  in  the  philosophy  of  empiricism, 
he  discovered  that  he  did  not  need  to  be  taught  philosophy,  for  he 
knew  enough  and  mastered  Afpiinas's  "Summa. "  The  precocious 
philosopher  showed  at  an  early  age  that  he  felt  the  great  importance 
of  "the  queen  and  mother  of  all  sciences";  philosophy  was  always 
the  subject  of  his  con vereat ions  and  letters.  lie  was  so  enamored 
of  the  .study  of  philosophy,  that  lie  spent  much  of  his  youth  and  of 
the  rest  of  his  stormy  life  in  devotion  to  it. 

"Philosophy  and  the  contemplation  of  nature,"  he  said,  "far 

17 


18  KOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PEILOSOPHY 

from  wearjnng  us,  form  such  an  agreeable  recreation  that  I  sliould 
not  be  disposed  to  sacrifice  it  for  any  other.  "^ 

"Day  and  night,"  he  said,  "I  roamed  through  flowery  paths,  as 
it  were,  in  the  vast  demesne  of  philosophical  lore,  feelihg  all  that 
joy  which  the  first  aspect  of  truth  infuses  into  the  soul,  feeling  that 
security  which  borders  on  hardihood,  feeling  those  indefinite  hopes 
peculiar  to  youth  when  for  the  first  time  turning,  with  elevated 
and  conscious  reflections,  to  the  universe  and  its  Creator,  thinking 
to  absorb  the  one  and  the  other  as  easily  as  we  breathe."^ 

We  are  told  that  no  difficulty  daunted  him;  nay,  difficulties  in- 
flamed his  ardor,  because  in  every  difficulty  he  saw  a  secret  calcu- 
lated to  arouse  his  curiosity,  a  treasure  to  discover.  Such  intellec- 
tual enthusiasm  actuated  him  to  read  all  the  ancient,  medieval,  and 
modern  philosophers,  and  to  collect  together  the  many  scattered 
fragments  of  truth  he  found  in  their  works.  It  is  said  of  him  that 
like  an  industrious  bee,  he  went  everj'where  in  quest  of  honey,  and 
wherever  he  found  any,  he  drew  it  forth.  Thus  here  and  there,  the 
shadow  of  some  antecedent  philosophy  can  be  retraced  in  his  works, 
but  he  was  a  disciple  of  nobody.  His  immense  philosophical  elab- 
oration had  as  its  source  only  his  intellectual  and  moral  temper,  his 
native  genius  as  well  as  his  mental  habits,  molded  as  they  were  by 
his  social  environment. 

The  bent  and  disposition  of  Eosmini's  mind  converged  not  only 
towards  contemplation,  but  toward  action  as  well.  He  was  ani- 
mated by  altruistic  feelings;  he  felt  impelled  to  communicate  his 
ideas  to  his  fellow-men. 

For  he  was  convinced  that  high  intellectual  culture  is  refining 
and  ennobling,  and  to  discover  truth  means  to  discover  the  means 
of  moral  progress.  It  filled  him  with  pain  ' '  to  think  that  truths  ex- 
cellent in  themselves  and  congenial  to  the  human  intelligence  should 
be  monopolized  by  a  small  circle  of  individuals,  as  though  none  but 
themselves  had  a  right  to  possess  them.  "^ 

And  referring  to  the  Scholastic  attitude  he  says,  "Is  there  not 
something  odious  and  hurtful  to  human  feeling  in  a  science  which, 
under  the  pretence  of  being  scholastic,  envelops  itself  in  mystery; 
which  seems  to  hate  the  light  of  day;  which  wears  all  the  appear- 
ance of  a  sect,  with  a  language,  or  rather  jargon,  of  its  own,  and 
forbidden  to  the  rest  of  men,  and  which  assumes  an  ambitious,  or 

1  Impelled  by  the  desire  of  spreading  philosophical  knowledge,  he  formed 
an  academy  of  young  philosophers  in  his  house.  The  members  of  the  new  aca- 
demy, eager  to  imitate  the  Peripatetics,  indulged  in  philosophical  discussions, 
wandering  about  the  charming  surroundings  of  Eovereto. 

2  "Introduzione  alia  filosofia. " 

»  "The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  Vol.  I.,  Ch.  III.,  §36. 


EOS  MINI'S  PERSONALITY  19 

at  least  a  strange  and  exclusive  tone,  as  if  it  liad  some  great  secret 
to  conceal,  or  some  dark  ends  to  accomplish?"* 

Thus,  Rosmini  could  not  conceive  philosophy  divorced  from 
human  affairs  and  interests.  "Why,"  he  asks,  "should  this  science, 
which  boasts  of  being  the  motiier  of  all  the  arts,  keep  itself  aloof 
from,  and  sullenly  refuse  to  hold  friendly  intercourse  with,  the 
human  family?  Has  it,  then,  like  some  beasts  of  a  new  species,  im- 
penetrable lairs,  wh(>re  to  abide  in  solitude,  from  fear  lest  its  in- 
terests shouUl  sutler  by  being  mixed  up  with  those  of  the  world  at 
large?  Or  has  heaven  bestowed  the  gift  of  reason  on  a  few  indi- 
viduals  only?  And  siuill,  therefore,  the  great  bulk  of  numkind  for- 
ever have  to  be  led,  like  a  Hoek  of  sheep,  by  the  command  or  the 
rod  of  those  favored  ones?  Must  incti  be  for  everlasting  debarred 
from  judging  in  a  body  or  pronouncing  on  matters  on  which  their 
own  dignity  and  happiness  depend?"'' 

Accordingly,  "a  good  instinct"  of  his  nature  irresistibly 
prompted  him  to  applaud  "intentions  so  humane,  and  to  feel  the 
liveliest  gratitiule  for  those  who  labor  with  the  intent  of  placing  the 
very  highest  truths  within  the  reach  of  the  greatest  number.  .  .  . 
For  if  this  were  well  and  successfully  done,  the  masses  would  be 
able  to  enjoy  in  some  way  the  lovable  aspect  of  those  truths,  and 
would  rise  to  a  better  condition."" 

Moreover,  he  thought  that  the  masses,  by  bringing  their  collec- 
tive judgment  to  bear  on  the  interminable  disputations  of  the 
learned,  might,  perhaps,  speak  out  with  such  an  overwhelming 
weight  of  authority  as  would  effectually  recall  these  disputants  to 
more  profitable  occupations  and  sountler  ways  of  thiidving,  and  to 
work  for  the  true  benefit  of  the  indiviilual  and  society.  Rosmini, 
persuaded  of  the  social  and  humane  mission  of  philosophy,  could 
not  fail  to  direct  his  attention  to  the  national  problem,  which  was 
already  the  focus  of  the  general  intellectual  activity.  He,  in  fact, 
like  the  elite  of  his  time,  did  not  make  a  mystery  of  his  love  for  the 
common  mother,  the  beloved  from  whom  he  had  had  "life  and  lan- 
guage."^ 

Eye-witnes.s  of  the  violences  perpetrated  by  th(^  French  armies 
as  well  as  of  the  angry  despotism  of  the  restored  governments,  he 
grieved  over  Italy's  unhappy  state  anrl  longed  for  the  freedom,  in- 
dependence, and  unity,  which  he  openly  proclaimed  to  be  "a  uni- 
versal cry"  that  set  throbbing  the  heart  of  every  Italian.'' 

*  "The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  toe.  cif. 
5  "The  Origin  of  Meas,"  loc.  cit. 
o"The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  loc.  cit. 

7  See  "  Xuovo  Saggio  HuH'origine  delle  idee,"  preface. 

8  See  "Discorso  suH'Unitii  .1 'Italia." 


20  EOSMINrS  COXTHIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHT 

It  seems,  however,  that  Rosmini  was  distressed  rather  by  the 
moral  disintegration  than  by  the  political  situation  of  his  country. 
All  his  works,  in  fact,  betray  a  strong  moral  preoccupation  and  a 
persistent  endeavor  to  point  out  moral  reconstruction  as  a  factor  of 
social  happiness.  But  the  Church's  declining  influence,  above 
everything  else,  attracted  his  attention.  His  native  religious  bias, 
under  the  constant  influence  of  his  social  environment,  became  a 
deep  and  inalterable  love  for  his  parents'  religion.  And  to  such  a 
love  the  Italian  philosopher  subordinated  his  whole  intellectual  ac- 
tivity. Thus,  it  was  inevitable  that  a  life  of  earnest  and  close  ad- 
hesion to  his  religion  would  have  created  in  his  mind  habits  of  in- 
tellectual submission  and  criticism  not  at  all  independent  and  im- 
partial. Besides,  his  woi'ks  bespeak  his  fondness  for  abstract,  fixed, 
and  eternal  principles,  his  idealistic  tendency,  his  dogmatic  affirma- 
tion, his  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  universals,  his  determination 
to  organize  an  absolute  system,  and  consequently,  his  rationalistic 
type  of  mind." 

2.  Rosmini' s  Leading  Motive,  Attitude,  and  Method 

Rosmini  seemed  to  be  convinced  of  the  fact  that  the  growing  indi- 
vidualism, the  ascending  democracy,  the  progress  of  national  feel- 
ing, and,  finall}^,  the  intellectual  undercurrents  of  social  life  had 
already  brought  into  question  the  ancient  beliefs  and  moral  stan- 
dards, and  that  even  the  position  of  the  Catholic  Church  had  been 
compromised,  being  thrown  by  clericalism  into  the  political  turmoil 
of  the  times.  He,  accordingly,  felt  stimulated  to  bring  his  contri- 
bution to  the  political,  intellectual,  and  moral  reconstruction  of  his 
beloved  country.  Impelled  by  a  motive  so  eminently  practical,  he 
applied  his  mind  to  an  etiological  inquiry  into  the  actual  conditions 
of  the  Church,  of  Italy,  and  of  philosophy. 

Under  the  pressure  of  his  native  dispositions,  acquired  habits, 
intellectual  temper,  and  of  the  dominant  current  of  thought,  per- 
meated with  spiritualism  and  religion,  the  Italian  philosopher  found 
out  that  the  divorce  of  the  Church  from  social  and  political  aspira- 
tions, of  faith  from  reason,  of  theology  from  philosophy,  was  the 
main  factor  in  the  restlessness  of  his  social  environment.  He, 
therefore,  urged  the  reconciliation  of  all  the  intellectual  and  social 
forces  as  the  panacea  for  all  the  evils  of  his  times.  Besides,  agree- 
ing with  the  prevailing  romantic  spirit,  he  pointed  to  the  Middle 
Ages  as  the  epoch  in  which  the  ideal  reconciliation  he  dreamed  of, 
the  genuine  greatness  of  Papacy  and  of  Italy,  and  the  lofty  task  of 

» See  W.  .James,  "Pragmatism,"  pages  7,  51;  "Some  Problems  of  Phi- 
losophy," page  35. 


EOSMIXI'S  PEESOXALITY  2i 

philosophy,  were  fully  realized.  His  discovery,  indeed,  could  not 
be  otherwise !  But  Rosmini  thought  that  such  harmonious  union 
had  been  shattered  by  tlie  movement  of  modern  philosophy.  Ac- 
cording to  him,  philosophy  "from  Locke  to  Kant,  in  spite  of  so  many 
efforts,  went  on  wandering  farther  and  fartlier  astray,  and  en- 
tangling itself  in  its  very  ])n)gress,  until  men  grew  weary  of  it,  and 
lost  all  faith  in  doctrines  tiiat  were  contimially  changing."'"' 

Thus,  he  believed  that  reason  was  to.ssed  about  by  the  waves  of 
skepticism  and  opinion,  and  that  there  was  no  longer  faith  in  any 
universally  valid  truth,  or  in  the  possibility  of  any  certain  knowl- 
edge, while  respect  for  authority  and  tradition  sank,  religious  feel- 
ings and  ideals  wavered,  ami   iinlividuals  governed  themselves. 

Sensationalism  and  subjectivism,  indeed,  acknowledging  no  es- 
sential objectivity  of  ideas  and  then  no  objective  measure  of  truth, 
and  relying  only  on  the  relativity  of  individual  ideas,  built  human 
knowledge  as  well  as  ethical  principles  upon  a  relativism  of  indi- 
vidual opinions,  and,  consequently,  upon  the  insecurity  of  change 
and  caprice.  This  philosophical  attitude  and  its  inevitable  conse- 
quence, the  absolute  independence  of  the  individual  in  the  theoret- 
ical and  practical  sphere,  and  "the  deification  of  human  faculties 
and  affections"  plainly  proclaimed  by  Kantian  doctrine,  hurt  Ros- 
mini's  religious  feeling,  for  they  meant  a  mortal  blow  to  religious 
tradition  and  to  organized  authority.  Thus  he  felt  that  there  was 
"a  yearning  for  the  invaluable  boon  of  a  true  and  .sound  philos- 
ophy," and  that  the  yearning  was  due  to  the  uncertain  utterances 
and  to  the  imperfect  and  unsatisfactory  .systems  which  philosophers 
had  already  propounded. 

Rosmini  was  penetrated  with  the  importance  of  philosophy  be- 
cause of  its  all-embracing  influence,  determining  the  source  of 
knowledge,  and  thus  making  all  sciences  dependent  on  itself.  Be- 
sides, philosophy,  in  his  opinion,  has  an  anthropological,  a  social, 
and  a  religious  mission,  since  it  is  the  interpreter  of  nature  as  well 
as  of  the  wishes  of  the  luiman  heart,  and  it  unites  men  amongst 
themselves  and  with  their  Creator.  Finally,  it  aims  at  the  better- 
ment of  men  by  discovering  and  transforming  truth  into  reality, 
and  by  leading  to  good  and  to  virtue,  as  to  their  natural  end.*^ 
Accordingly,  for  Rosmini,  the  restoration  of  philo.soi)hy  was  aji 
urgent  need,  and  it  could  not  be  achieved  without  a  firm  epistemo- 
logical  ground. 

Rosmini,  agreeing  with  Locke  and  Kant,  was  impres.sed  from 
his  early  youth,  by  the   practical   importance  of  the   problem  of 

""Theodicy,"  Ch.  XXIX,  No.  148.    Longmans,  Green,  and  Company,  \ew 
York,  1912. 

11  See  ''Introduzione  alia  filosofia.  " 


/ 


22  BOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPnY 

knowledge.  He  justly  recognized  that  the  most  urgent  question  to 
be  solved  in  philosophy  was  whether,  above  and  beyond  individual 
opinions  and  purposes,  there  is  anything  universally  valid,  true, 
and  right  in  itself;  whether  our  ideas  have  a  really  objective  value 
and  provide  a  firm  basis  for  knowledge  and  morality ;  wliether  at 
that  time  of  political  and  moral  unrest  there  could  be  found  a  basis 
for  common  truth  and  good  which  might  become  a  ground  of  a 
social  agreement  and  political  cooperation.  According  to  our  philos- 
opher, the  science  of  individual  and  social  ethics,  law,  government, 
education,  which  the  political  situation  threw  into  the  front  rank  of 
intellectual  interests;  man's  faith  in  absolute  justice;  the  changeless 
right  of  nations  to  political  independence  and  liberty ;  the  necessity 
of  suppressing  despotism  as  well  as  rebellion ;  had  to  rest  upon  a 
knowledge,  not  transient  and  relative,  but  stable  and  unchangeable. 
Such  a  knowledge,  however,  must  have  for  its  basis,  not  the  chance 
ideas  furnished  by  sense-experience,  but  the  ideal  order,  "the  innate 
idea  of  the  universal  which  is  the  truly  real;"  it  must  rest  "on  an 
object,"  says  Rosmini,  "which  is  always  before  us,  necessary,  uni- 
versal, and  independent  of  us  and  all  created  things.  "^^ 

The  persistent  effort  to  indicate  the  idea  of  the  universal  as 
source  of  objective  and  absolute  truth,  as  nucleus  of  the  new  national 
mental  and  moral  life,  as  point  of  centralization  of  intellectual  and 
political  activity,  meant  the  accumulation  of  individual  energies, 
the  absorption  and  submission  of  the  individual  to  organized  society 
as  well  as  to  the  common  supreme  ideal  of  national  solidarity  and 
unity,  and  constitutes  the  essential  characteristic  of  Rosmini 's  phi- 
losophy. 

The  mental  attitude  Rosmini  assumed  towards  the  philosophical 
problems  which  his  contemporaries  confronted  was  religious  and 
reactionary,  but  softened  by  a  spirit  of  conciliation  that  was  in  the 
air.  He  seemed  to  be  determined  to  revive  the  attitude  of  the  Holy 
Fathers,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  avail  themselves  of  whatsoever 
truth  the  systems  of  pagan  philosophers  contained  in  order  to  secure 
rational  support  for  their  beliefs. 

But  our  philosopher,  like  them,  wanted  to  subordinate  knowl- 
edge to  the  lofty  ends  of  faith,  reason  to  revelation,  philosophy  to 
theology,  science  to  dogma.  Besides,  he  endeavored  to  bring  Chris- 
tianity as  an  efficient  factor  into  philosophical  speculation,  and  thus 
to  harmonize  natural  and  supernatural  truths.  Convinced  that  the 
most  striking  characteristics  of  every  true  and  efficient  philosoph- 
ical system  are  "unity  and  totality,"  he  built,  like  his  contemporary 
German  philosophers,  a  gigantic  system  in  which  he  thought  it  pos- 
sible to  take  in  at  a  glance,  almost  all  truths,  arranged  in  a  scheme 

12  "The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  No.  1037,  Vol.  II. 


EOSMINI'S  PERSONALITY  03 

of  beautiful  uuity,  and  enhanced  with  new  life  by  "the  evidence  of 
a  supreme  principle."'^ 

But  in  one  point  Rosniini  gladly  ajjreed  with  modern  philoso- 
phers, namely,  in  the  method  to  be  used  in  philosophy,  that  is,  a 
method  which  starts  from  facts.  lie  found,  howevt-r,  that  "modern 
philosophers  have  contented  themselves  with  analyzin<;  the  faculties 
of  the  soul,  and  have  paid  little  attention  to  the  analysis  of  tlieir 
product,  /.  e.,  human  cojjnitions.  "'^ 

Acconlinj]:  to  him,  the  rijjjht  method  is  to  observe  what  is  pjiven 
by  our  corporeal  senses  and  at  the  same  time  the  facts  of  our  inner 
life  and  then  to  accept  imj)artially  the  lc<;itimate  eonse(iuenct's  of 
the  same.^^ 

Our  philosopher,  however,  almost  exclusively  employed  the  syn- 
thetic method  and  thus  replaced  the  concrete  by  the  abstract,  the 
fact  by  the  idea,  the  internal  observation  by  (i  priori  reasoning, 
making  the  study  of  man  depend  on  metaphysics.  He  preferred 
deduction  to  induction,  the  a  priori  to  direct  observation,  reasoning 
to  experience.  He  proved,  indeed,  to  be  a  psychologist,  but  he  often 
recurred  to  hypothesis  rather  than  to  analysis,  to  syllogism  rather 
than  to  experiment. 

;i.    The   Fundamental   Principle   of  Rosniini\s  rhilosophij 

"Unity  and  totality"  is,  according  to  Rosniini.  the  main  charac- 
teristic of  a  true  and  efficient  philosophy.'"  This  characteristic, 
which  we  find  in  the  contemporary  romantic  philosophy,  he  endeav- 
ored to  .stamp  upon  his  own.  Accordingly,  he  elaborated  his  ethical 
and  theoretical  doctrine  in  close  connection;  his  ideology  and  ethics 
are  so  interrelated  that  the  one  lends  light  to  tlu^  other.  Thus,  the 
distinctive  marks  of  the  leading  principles  of  his  ethical  theory 
can  not  be  given  apart  from  the  general  principles  of  his  philosophy. 

A.S  we  have  seen,  Rosmini,  under  the  pres.sure  of  Italy's  political 
and  moral  problem  thought  that  the  main  business  of  philosophy 
was  to  build  human  knowledge  upon  a  fixed  basis,  and  thus  to  cheek 
the  deplored  outcome  of  skepticism  and  materialism,  and.  by  placing 
rea.son  in  opposition  to  opinion,  to  overcome  anarchical  change  which 
sensationalism  and  empiricism  favored.  Rut,  according  to  him.  as 
well  as  to  Kant,  the  difficulty  of  the  problem  of  knowledge  lies  in  the 
po.ssibility  of  the  first  judgment.  Knowledge  is  judgment,  and  then 
the  analysis  of  the  first  knowledge  or  judgment  is  the  first  step  in 
every  serious  philosophical  research.     Now,  the  essence  of  judgment 

13  See  "  Introdiizione  alia  filosofia. " 
""The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  No.  410. 
""Theorlioy,"  No.  138,  Vol.  1. 
16 See  "  Introtluzione  alia  filosofia." 


24  BOSMINI'S  CONTBIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

consists  in  the  union  of  a  subject  individual  and  of  a  predicate,  of 
a  particular  idea  and  of  a  universal  idea.  Thus  every  judgment 
supposes  a  universal  idea.  Experience  gives  us  particular  ideas  or 
the  matter  of  knowledge.  The  universal  idea,  however,  or  the  form 
can  derive  neither  from  sense-experience,  for  this  happens  w'ithin 
the  sphere  of  contigent  facts  and  reaches  nothing  beyond  the  indi- 
vidual, nor  from  reflection,  which  is  an  operation  of  the  mind,  and 
every  intellectual  operation  is  a  judgment.  The  exclusion  of  these 
two  possibilities,  the  former  as  insufficient,  and  the  latter  as  form- 
ing a  vicious  circle,  leaves  one  last  hypothesis,  namely,  that  the  uni- 
versal idea  is  prior,  that  is,  innate.  Thus  within  human  reason 
there  is  at  least  a  notion  wiiich  is  primitive,  indispensable  to  the 
formation  of  the  first  judgment,  and  which  is  the  first  condition  and 
link  of  human  knowledge.  This  primitive  idea  is  the  light  and  life 
of  reason,  and  the  form  of  forms;  since  it  is  universal,  it  is  also  the 
most  elementary  and  simple  and  it  is  to  be  found,  accordingly,  in 
every  judgment,  in  every  operation  of  our  mind  as  its  most  essen- 
tial factor.  It  contains  necessarily  as  in  germ  all  human  knowl- 
edge ;  it  is  the  ruling  thought,  and  successively  becomes  cause,  sub- 
stance, finality.  According  to  Rosmini,  such  an  idea  can  not  but  be 
the  ''idea  of  being"  or  the  "ideal  being."  In  fact,  our  internal 
analysis  shows  us  that  our  cognitions  have  the  idea  of  being  as  a 
common  element.     This  idea  is  at  the  bottom  of  every  thought. 

"The  idea  of  being,"  he  says,  "is  the  most  universal  of  all 
ideas.  It  is  w^hat  remains  after  the  last  abstraction  possible ;  and 
its  removal  puts  an  end  to  all  thought  and  makes  every  other  idea 
impossible.  "^^ 

' '  Man  has  by  nature  an  intuition  of  that  ideal  and  indeterminate 
being  which  contains  all  entity  in  an  indistinct  state,  in  a  way  ana- 
logous to  that  in  which  a  large  block  of  marble  contains  all  the 
statues  which  the  sculptor  proposes  to  make  out  of  it,  or  a  given 
superficies  all  the  figures  that  can  be  designed  thereon.  "^^ 

This  "corner-stone"  of  the  edifice  of  human  knowledge,  virtue, 
and  happiness,  which  Rosmini  sought  from  his  early  youth,  this 
nucleus,  source,  and  rule  of  every  art  and  science,  this  very  efficient 
means  of  philosophical  and  social  restoration,  is  not  a  production  of 
reason  itself;  it  does  not  derive  from  the  thinking  self,  like  the  Kan- 
tian forms;  but  it  is  communicated  from  without,  and  it  is,  there- 
fore, not  subjective,  but  objective.^" 

17  "The  Origin  of  Ideas,"  A'ol.  II.,  No.  411,  page  17. 

18  "  Theodicy, "  Vol.  II.,  No.  668,  page  159. 

19  See  "Filosofia  del  Diritto, "  Introdiizione.  Pagani  reports  in  his  "Life 
of  Rosmini ' '  that  the  Italian  philosopher  proposed  to  himself  the  great  problem 
of  the  origin  of  ideas  when  he  was  seventeen  years  old  (1814),  and  that  in  the  fol- 
lowing year  he  discovered  the  fundamental  principle  of  his  philosophy. 


PART    II 


THE  ESSENTIAL  FEATURES  OF  KOSMINI'S  ETHICAL  THEORY 

INTRODUCTORY 

The  Scope  and  ^Ietuod  of  Ethics 

The  science  of  ethics  is,  according  to  Rosmini,  the  director  of 
human  life,  since  its  purpose  is  to  direct  man's  rational  activity. 
Man's  goodness,  however,  depends  upon  the  goodness  of  his  will,  for 
the  will  is  the  supreme  and  active  rational  power,  which  controls 
and  synthesizes  all  his  intellectual  and  moral  actions.  Nay,  the 
will  is  precisely  the  same  radical  and  immanent  activity  which  con- 
stitutes human  personality.  Whence  our  philosopher  concludes 
that  man  is  moral,  because  his  will  is  susceptible  of  good  and  bad 
activity,  of  moral  or  immoral  acts  and  habits,  or,  in  one  word,  of 
morality.^ 

Thus  the  crux  of  every  theory  is  to  discover  the  factors  which 
make  good  man's  will,  or,  in  other  words,  what  is  "moral  good"  or 
"virtue."  Man  is  endowed  with  the  faculty  of  sensation  as  well  as 
with  that  of  intelligence.  By  the  faculty  of  .sensation,  he  perceives 
things  as  they  are;  by  the  faculty  of  intelligence,  he  perceives  things 
as  possible.  This  different  mode  of  perceiving  is,  according  to  our 
philosopher,  the  cause  of  distinction  between  subjective  and  objec- 
tive good. 

The  sense  is  the  source  of  subjective  good ;  the  intellect  is  the 
source  of  objective  good.  Every  sensible  good  stimulates  and  satis- 
fies man;  and  he  is  naturally  impelled  to  unite  himself  to  such  a 
good,  and  to  enjoy  it.  Man,  however,  does  not  regard  the  objective 
or  "intelligible"  good  as  .sometliing  which  belongs  to  himself,  as 
something  which  may  be  felt  by  him.  He  merely  eonsidei's  it  as  an 
object  of  his  intelligence,  of  his  intellectual  intuition  everywhere 
and  in  wliatsoever  mode  it  may  be  found.  "The  objective  good  is 
merely  contemplated  by  the  intelligence."  Now,  the  burning  ques- 
tion is  whether  the  moral  good  is  subjective  or  objective. 

Rosmini  believes  this  distinction  to  be  of  the  highest  importance, 

1  See  "Antropologia,"  I.,  IV..  €hs.  VL,  VIII.;  "Prefazione  alle  opere  di 
filosofia  morale";  "Compendio  di  etica."  Introduzione,  §§I.,  11.;  "Thco<licy," 
Xo9.  398,  410. 

25 


26  BOSMINI'S  CONTSIBVTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

since  the  confusion  of  tlie  two  kinds  of  good  has  brought  ruin  to 
philosophy  and  morals.-  He  praises  the  German  school  because  of 
its  contribution  to  the  important  distinction,  whereby  ethics  has 
been  delivered  from  the  motivation  of  happiness.^ 

To  say  that  moral  good  is  subjective,  is,  according  to  Rosmini, 
to  base  it  upon  the  relativity  of  human  ideas  and  purposes,  and, 
consequently,  upon  individual  opinions,  preferences,  and  caprices; 
thus  it  can  be  found  together  with  a  bad  will.  This  is  the  fatal 
consequence  of  the  philosophy  of  sense.  But  our  philosopher,  im- 
pelled by  the  bias  of  his  mind  and  character,  is  determined  to  oppose 
such  philosophical  premises  and  ethical  consequences.  He  seems 
thoroughly  convinced  that  the  ethical  conduct  of  life  needs  sure 
principles,  that  the  norm  and  standard  for  the  valuation  of  worth 
must  be  unique,  fixed,  and  absolute,  and,  finally,  that  it  may  be 
found  above  and  beyond  individual  experience,  in  a  Platonic  meta- 
physical atmosphere, 

Rosmini,  following  the  German  philosophers,  eliminates  happi- 
ness, that  is  to  say,  just  what  the  Greek  thought  to  be  its  essential 
element,  from  the  science  of  ethics.  He  holds  that  ethics  is  only 
concerned  with  moral  good.  Eudemonology  is  the  science  which 
deals  with  happiness. 

Thus,  the  great  problem  the  moral  philosopher  is  called  upon 
to  solve  is  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  moral  good.  It  is  indeed  a 
problem  of  the  highest  practical  importance,  since  human  happiness 
depends  upon  its  right  solution.  The  nature  of  moral  good,  how- 
ever, may  be  traced  only  by  the  analysis  of  its  fundamental  factors. 
Now,  from  all  Rosmini 's  ethical  works  it  may  be  concluded  that  he 
thinks  the  moral  good  to  be  the  outcome  of  two  main  factors,  one 
of  which  we  may  call  ''metaphysical"  and  the  other  "psycholog- 
ical.'' According  to  him,  all  ethical  judging,  the  will  and  its  whole 
activity,  must  conform  to  a  supreme  and  fundamental  law  of  action, 
which  is  categorically  imperative,  universally  true  and  valid  as  well 
as  universally  uniform.  This  is,  for  him  as  for  Kant,  the  most  sig- 
nificant feature  of  morality.  Such  a  law,  however,  which  he  sup- 
poses to  be  prior  to  all  particular  laws,  grounding  their  existence 
and  obligatory  force,  is  objective,  absolute,  and  independent  of  all 
empirical  motives. 

This  primal  and  fundamental  law  is  the  metaphysical  and  chief 
factor  of  morality ;  it  constitutes  its  essence.  Bufr  the  law  presup- 
poses an  agent,  and  an  agent  capable  of  adjusting  himself;  it  presup- 

2  See  "Prefazione  alle  opere  di  filosofia  morale";  "Priucipii  della  scienza 
morale,"  Ch.  III.;  "Storia  comparativa  e  critica  intorno  al  principio  della 
morale,"  etc. 

3  See  "Prineipii  della  scienza  morale,"  op.  cit.,  Ch.  III.^  a.  I. 


THE  SCOPE  AND  METHOD   OF  ETHICS  27 

poses  a  free  will.     Neither  the  law  nor  the  will  alone  constitutes 
morality. 

The  moral  situation,  according  to  Rosmini,  involves  also  the 
psychological  factor,  and  both  ethical  factors,  not  asumler,  but  in 
reciprocal  relation.  The  science  of  ethics  is  then  confronted  by 
another  problem  of  no  less  importance :  the  problem  of  the  nature 
of  the  agent  and  of  the  relation  between  law  and  the  will  in  order 
to  have  human  actions  clothed  with  morality,  and  therefore  good. 

It  is  the  business  of  ethics  to  answer  these  central  problems, 
which  form  the  core  of  every  ethical  theory.  Let  us  notice  here  that 
Rosmini  does  not  regard  an  ethical  theory  as  a  working  hypothesis, 
since  ethics  is  not  for  him  hypothetical,  conditional,  and  relative, 
lie  considers  ethical  tlicoiy  as  helpful  to  morals  because  of  its 
formulation  of  fixed  precepts  for  action,  rather  than  for  the  scien- 
tific insight  it  affords  into  trutli.  Tie  does  not  define  ethical  theory 
from  the  standpoint  of  principles  which  can  provide  a  method  of 
action,  but  from  that  of  rules  which  are  prescriptions  for  it.  Ethics, 
however,  is  a  science  for  him,  not  an  art,  as  for  Joim  Stuart  Mill.* 
It  is,  indeed,  a  science  because  it  formulates  laws,  but  it  is  a 
practical  science,  as  its  laws  are  formulated  for  the  sake  of  action. 
It  may,  accordingly,  be  called  "the  theory  of  practise"  or  "the 
theory  of  action."^ 

Ethics,  says  Rosmini,  is  "the  science  which  gives  systematic  order 
to  the  norms  to  which  human  actions  must  adjust  themselves,  and 
determines  the  relation  between  actions  and  norms.""* 

*" Logic,"  Book  6,  Ch.  12. 

5 See  "Prefazione  alio  opore  di  filosofia  morale." 

6  See  "Sistcnia  lilosofiio, "  No.  21G. 


CHAPTER  I 

The  ]\Ietaphysical   Factor  of  Morality 

EosMiNi,  being  determined  to  set  up  the  ideal  of  reason  against 
the  relativism  of  sense,  seems  to  regard  as  basic  the  conviction  that 
the  concept  is  the  goal  of  science,  since  conception  alone  gives  us 
the  permanent  essence  of  things,  while  the  objective  content  of  con- 
ceptual knowledge  is  the  idea.  According  to  him.  the  idea  is  merely 
the  immediate  and  direct  cognition  of  things  in  their  proper  essence, 
which  is  eternal.^ 

Since  an  idea  is  an  essence,  and  since  our  judgment  is  always 
right  when  an  idea  is  its  rule,  Rosmini  thinks  that  an  idea,  a  notion, 
is  also  the  rule  or  standard  according  to  which  we  must  judge  of 
the  morality  of  our  actions,  and  behave :  that  is  to  say  that  the 
moral  law  is  nothing  else  than  an  idea.-  The  notion  of  "perni- 
ciousness, ' '  for  instance,  is  the  notion  through  which  w^e  know  what 
actions  are  pernicious  or  not.  We  compare  and  conform  our  ac- 
tions with  such  a  notion,  as  if  it  were  a  type.  The  moral  law  is 
then  a  notion.  Besides,  Rosmini  seems  to  accept  the  law  exalted  by 
Socrates  to  the  principle  of  scientific  method,  namely,  the  law  of 
logical  dependence  of  the  particulars  upon  the  universal.  He 
thinks,  accordingly,  that  every  notion  supposes  and  depends  upon 
another,  anterior  to  itself,  and  that  a  series  of  notions  supposes  a 
primordial  one  that  is  the  ground  upon  which  all  the  others  are 
based.  Thus,  since  moral  norms  are  nothing  else  but  notions,  ac- 
cording to  our  philosopher,  they  also  suppose  a  notion  which  is  the 
first  of  the  whole  possible  series.  And  he  finds  that  every  moral 
law  is  indeed  permeated  with  a  common  form  or  idea,  as  every  one 
indicates  and  prescribes  something  common,  or  what  is  "moral 
good"  in  human  action.  From  that  he  concludes  that  all  laws  are 
derived  from  a  fundamental  one,  or,  in  other  words,  they  are  noth- 
ing else  but  applications  and  consequences  of  a  primordial  and  basic 
one.  That  is  the  fundamental  idea  through  which  we  form  our 
moral  judgments.  Now,  the  question  arises:  Wliat  is  this  funda- 
mental idea  or  notion?  What  is  this  primal  and  basal  law?  Ros- 
mini thinks  that  such  notion  and  law  are  the  outcome  neither  of 

1  See  "Psychology,"  No.  1339;  "Prineipii  della  scienza  morale,"  Ch.  I., 
a.  I.,  and  Ch.  II.,  a.  II.  " L'essenza,"  says  Eosmiui,  "non  c  se  non  do  che  si 
comprende  nella  idea  della  medesima." 

2  "Prineipii,"  op.  cit.,  Ch.  I.,  a.  I. 

28 


THE  METAPnYSICAL  FACTOFi   OF  MOJ^ALITY  2i) 

experience,  nor  of  reflection,  as  they  iiave  nothiiipr  to  do  witli  man's 
sensuous  nature,  nor  with  the  whole  workl  of  phenomena.  Man  as 
sensuous  being  can  aft'ord  no  foundation  for  a  law  which  is  supposed 
to  be  supreme,  and  independent  of  all  emi)irical  motives.  Its  seat  is 
indeed  man  as  noumenon.  to  use  Kant's  language,  or  his  rea.son, 
that  is  to  say,  his  essential  ami  characteristic  part.  The  funda- 
mental law,  however,  is  not  a  product  of  rea.son,  as  Kant  holds  it  to 
be.  Rosmini  thinks  that  the  notion  which  is  the  root  of  all  laws 
and  moral  noi-ms.  which  is  valid  and  uniform  universally  for  ra- 
tional beings,  can  not  be  created  by  reason.  According  to  him.  it 
is  an  original  possession  of  the  mind.  Our  mind  is  passive,  as  the 
law  is  given  to  it  prior  to  all  perception  or  individual  cognition. 
Such  a  notion,  moreover,  according  to  Rosmini,  is  endowed  with 
immutability,  eternity,  universality,  and  necessity.^ 

Now,  the  idea,  endowed  with  such  divine  characteristics,  can  not 
fail  to  be  the  idea  of  being,  not  of  this  or  that  being,  but  of  uni- 
versal being.  The  idea  of  being  is  anterior  to  all  .sensations  and 
association,  and  then  to  all  ideas;  it  is  found  at  the  bottom  of  every 
thought ;  it  is  used  by  our  mind  as  the  rule  of  all  our  judgments.* 
Since  the  first  Idea  is  the  factor  and  source  of  all  judgments,  it 
follows  that  it  is  also  the  factor  and  source  of  all  ethical  judgments, 
and  thus  that  it  is  the  fundamental  law,  the  generator  and  the 
raison  d'etre  of  all  laws  and  moral  standards.  Besides,  since  it  is 
the  light  of  reason  and  since  our  mind,  when  it  reasons  and  judges, 
does  nothing  but  apply  it,  we  ought  to  follow  it  wlion  we  perform 
our  actions.  By  so  doing,  we  follow  a  fixed  and  absolute  rule  and 
ideal  of  rightness,  or  truth  itself. 

But  how  may  the  ideal  being,  or  the  essence  of  being,  be  the  su- 
preme moral  rule,  or  the  rule  of  moral  good  ?  IIow  may  it  ho  the 
means  whereby  we  judge  of  the  good  and  evil  of  our  actions?  IIow 
may  it  be  the  supreme  criterion  or  standard  of  morality? 

Rosmini  thinks  that  the  moral  good  of  liuman  conduct  is  a  kind 
of  good ;  accordingly,  we  can  not  judge  of  it.  unless  we  have  first 
the  notion  of  good  in  general.  By  defining  the  moral  good,  we  do 
nothing  else  than  determine  and  limit  the  universal  notion  of 
good,  and  adapt  it  to  moral  science,  which  does  not  deal  with  the 
general  good,  but  with  a  special  good,  namely,  with  the  moral. 
What  is  then  good  in  general  ? 

Our  philosopher  makes  an  original  analysis  of  th<^  nature  of 
pood.  Men,  he  says,  usually  claim  as  "good"  the  object  which 
pleasantly  stimulates  and  answers  to  our  faculty  of  desiring,  namely, 
the  faculty  which  impels  us  to  enjoy  the  good.     Of  course,  an  ob- 

«  See  "Principii,  op.  cit.,  Cli.  T. 

<See  "New  Essay  on  the  Origin  of  Idea?,"  Nos.  558-574. 


30  BOSMINI'S  CONTEIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ject  which  is  provocative  of  abhorrence  rather  than  of  longing  to 
possess  and  enjoy  it,  is  never  said  to  be  "good."  Thus  the  real 
and  concrete  good  involves  some  interdependence,  some  connection, 
some  relation  between  things  and  our  appetitive  power;  it  implies, 
from  one  side,  the  adaptability,  the  fitness  of  things  to  satisfy  our 
needs,  our  craving,  our  personal  convenience,  and,  from  the  other, 
the  existence  of  our  conative  impulse  towards  them. 

Such  interrelation  supposes,  indeed,  a  being  capable  of  feeling, 
of  desiring,  and  of  seeking  the  objects  which  are  endowed  with  pro- 
vocative characteristics.  Now,  may  such  a  being  fail  to  desire  itself? 
No,  indeed.  Its  tendencies  fatally  converge  towards  the  preserva- 
tion and  development  of  its  own  nature.  It  would  be  an  obvious 
inconsistency  to  say  that  a  being  might  long  for  its  own  annihilation, 
as  annihilation  is  nothing,  and  nothingness  can  not  be  the  object  of  an 
appetite.  Every  existing  being  then  has  a  tendency  to  unfold  itself,  to 
better  itself,  and  to  preserve  itself.  Development,  perfection,  and 
preservation  are  its  good. 

The  same  power  of  desiring  is  nothing  else  but  the  power  of  aim- 
ing at  its  own  perfection,  and  at  everything  that  has  the  possibility 
of  helping  to  reach  the  natural  goal  of  every  being,  that  is  to  say,  its 
expansion  of  life,  its  totality  and  completion,  or,  in  a  word,  its  good. 

Good  and  Being,  therefore,  are  identical  terms,  and  the  ancients 
were  right  to  define  good  as  the  end  of  all  things  and  the  object  of 
universal  desire.  The  identity  of  Good  and  Being  is  also  confirmed 
by  the  analysis  of  the  satisfaction  of  our  appetitive  faculty.  Ros- 
mini  finds  in  every  satisfaction  two  elements,  namely,  a  general 
condition  of  well-being  or  an  enjoyment,  and  a  perfection,  a  value, 
or  some  worth  which  is  enjoyed.  The  question  naturally  arises 
whether  these  two  elements  of  the  subjective  good  are  necessary  to 
constitute  the  concept  of  good,  or  whether  one  alone  is  sufficient. 
When  we  indicate  the  perfections  or  values  of  a  certain  nature,  do 
we  not  indicate  so  many  goods?  Do  we  not  give  an  account 
of  them  before  considering  any  appetitive  power?  Are  we  not 
wont  to  attribute  degrees  of  perfection  and  good  even  to  inanimate 
and  insensible  natures?  Do  we  not  usually  say  that  every  thing  is 
good,  when  it  is  considered  in  its  own  nature?  Do  we  not  take  as 
synonymous  terms  "perfection  and  good"?  Do  we  not  conceive 
the  perfections  of  the  various  natures  as  so  many  beings  inde- 
pendently of  the  subject  which  might  be  stimulated  by  them,  and 
might  long  for  them  ?  Rosmini  thinks  that  man 's  idea  of  perfection 
or  value  is  the  outcome  of  experience.  For  a  sensible  being  can 
not  perceive  any  perfection  if  it  does  not  feel  it;  and  our  mind 
can  not  think  of  a  certain  good,  unless  it  is  presented  to  it  by  feeling.^ 

5  See  ' '  Principii, ' '  op.  cit.,  Ch.  II.,  a.  I. ;  his  "  Ideologia. ' ' 


TEE  METAPHYSICAL  FACTOli  OF  MOEALITT  31 

Accordingly,  the  former  (luestion  may  be  expressed  as  follows: 
Since  we  can  not  perceive  and  hence  can  not  know  the  worth  of 
the  various  natures,  unless  we  have  some  feeling  and  appetite,  does 
it  follow  that  the  feeling  and  appetite  are  also  necessary  to  their 
existence?  In  other  words,  may  a  perfection,  a  ^'ood,  exist  without 
being  sensible  ? 

Rosmini  hokls  that  it  is  of  the  highest  iiiipoi'tiuiee  to  iiotiee  that 
a  thing  to  be  evaluated,  to  be  a  perfection,  must  afford  some  sensible 
satisfaction,  that  is  to  say,  its  qualities  must  be  felt  by  some  agent. 
It  thus  implies  some  relation  to  some  sense,  and  then  to  some  being, 
for  whom  alone  it  has  value.  A  perfection  which  does  not  give  any 
enjoyment,  does  not  perfect,  can  not  be  conceived  as  such.  A  per- 
fection, therefore,  involves  "sensibility,"  that  is  to  say,  adaptation, 
aptitude  to  be  felt  and  desired;  it  involves  some  relation  to  a  being 
endowed  with  the  power  of  feeling.  Even  the  perfections  of  inani- 
mate things  are  said  to  be  perfections  because  of  their  relation  to 
some  being  furnished  with  senses. 

Thus,  we  may  conclude  that  neither  enjoyment,  nor  perfection, 
alone,  is  the  essential  constituent  of  the  idea  of  good.  Both  are 
required  to  constitute  it,  as  both  are  so  closely  interdependent  that 
they  can  not  be  conceived  a.sunder.  A  desirable  object  always  pre- 
supposes a  feeling  subject;  and  an  object  which  is  enjoyed  always 
involves  a  relation  to  some  agent ;  the  goodness  of  both  objects  im- 
plies the  exi.stence  of  some  being.  The  analysis  of  the  subjective 
and  empirical  good  proves,  according  to  Rosmini,  that  Being  and 
Good  are  identical  terms.  Our  philosopher  proves  their  identity 
by  considering  the  good,  not  only  in  its  relation  to  sen.se  and  appe- 
tites, and  then  to  some  being,  but  even  by  the  analysis  of  the  concept 
of  good,  namely,  by  investigating  what  our  understanding  recog- 
nizes and  distinguishes  within  the  concept  of  good.  According  to 
him.  our  undei'standing  considering  good  as  its  own  object,  or  as 
concept,  sees  it  stripped  of  its  relation  to  feeling.  For  it  is  its  law 
to  forget,  or,  at  lea.st,  not  to  notice  what  is  mingled  at  the  very  be- 
giiHiing  of  the  process  of  formation  of  concepts.  These  being 
formed,  are  kept  under  a  synthetic  condition,  inuler  a  fornnda  of 
what  our  understanding  saw  in  the  first  and  immediate  cognition, 
and  to  it  we  refer,  without  paying  any  more  attention  to  what  is 
present  in  .sen.sation.  In  like  manner,  if  we  examine  the  origin  of 
our  idea  of  good  and  perfection,  we  find  that  at  the  very  beginning 
we  have  aasociated  an  agreeable  .sensation  with  it.  .so  that  we  did 
not  recognize  any  good,  uidess  it  was  followed  by  .some  plea.sant 
impression.  After  having  acquired  the  habit  of  attributing  the 
concept  of  perfection  to  things  we  have  known  by  experience  to  be 
pleasant,  we  think  of  them,  without  paying  any  more  attention  to 


32  BOSMINI'S  CONTFIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

their  power  of  modifying  us  pleasantly.  Thus  the  term  "perfec- 
tion" is  gradually  freed  in  our  mind  from  its  relation  to  the  senses; 
it  acquires  a  general  value;  it  becomes  a  universal  concept,  and 
thus  independent  of  its  connection  with  sensuous  nature,  Rosmini 
notices  that  our  understanding  goes  further  in  this  process  of  ideal- 
ization, as  it  also  observes  the  pleasant  or  painful  condition  of  the 
human  body  to  correspond  to  a  certain  disposition  of  its  parts,  to  a 
certain  order  in  the  measure,  in  the  form,  in  the  number,  in  the  re- 
ciprocal connection  and  action  of  its  parts.  Thus,  such  intrinsic 
order,  to  which  a  pleasant  sensation  corresponds,  is  considered  as 
perfection  of  the  human  body.  In  that  case,  however,  we  still  call 
perfection  the  condition  of  the  body  coexistent  with  the  agreeable 
feeling.  But  we  afterwards  generalize  our  own  experience,  and,  ob- 
serving the  other  beings,  animate  and  sensible  like  us,  regard  them 
as  perfect,  because  we  are  aware  that  they  realize  their  ideal  type, 
they  arc  what  they  ought  to  be,  they  "are,"  namely,  they  conform 
to  their  essence,  and,  accordingly,  they  seem  to  enjoy  the  most 
pleasant  existence. 

In  the  same  manner,  we  see  inanimate  beings  to  be  more  or  less 
fit  to  subserve  our  own  needs,  or  those  of  other  beings,  because  they 
have  a  certain  condition,  configuration,  and  composition,  or,  in  other 
words,  they  are  what  they  ought  to  be,  namely,  useful  and  agree- 
able. In  all  these  cases  the  term  "perfection"  has  the  meaning  of 
the  intrinsic  order,  of  the  most  complete  condition  of  development 
and  realization  of  every  being. 

Such  essential  order,  however,  such  completeness  or  perfection 
exists  only  within  our  understanding,  because  of  its  own  process,  as 
concept  or,  what  is  just  the  same  for  Rosmini,  as  essence.  Thus, 
the  essence  of  a  being  is  its  ideal  type,  or  the  rule  or  criterion,  ac- 
cording to  which  we  judge  of  the  degrees  of  its  goodness.  We 
think  its  good  to  be  what  is  required  by  its  essence,  what  unfolds 
and  realizes  it,  or,  in  other  words,  what  is  appropriate  to  its  nature, 
and  harmonizes  with  its  existence. 

The  energies  of  every  being  naturally  seek  that  end,  as  its  most 
perfect  and  typical  condition.  Thus  the  analysis  of  the  idea  of 
good  shows  that  Being  and  Good  are  two  terms  involving  each  other ; 
that  they  are  two  aspects  of  the  same  truth.  The  Scholastic  saying 
^'ens  et  honum  convertuntur"  is  justified.  Now,  it  is  important  to 
notice  that  the  value,  perfection,  or  the  good  of  beings  is  contem- 
plated, indeed,  by  our  intelligence,  but  it  is  contemplated,  accord- 
ing to  Rosmini,  as  something  real,  objective,  and  then  independently 
of  the  pleasant  sensuous  effect,  as  it  is  seen  under  the  light  of  the 
primordial  object  of  our  mind,  or,  of  ideal  being.  Whence  it  fol- 
lows that  all  essences  are  nothing  else,  for  our  philosopher,  but  de- 


THE  METAPHYSICAL   FACTOIl  OF  MORALITY  33 

terminations  and  limitations  of  the  universal  and  ideal  Being  itself. 
Besides,  it  follows  that  the  idea  of  good,  like  the  idea  of  being,  is 
more  general  than  sensation,  it  is  prior  to  it. 

Rosmini  notices,  moreover,  tliat,  since  the  vahie  or  good  of  a 
being  is  found  in  the  realization  of  its  essence,  it  follows  tiiat  every- 
thing which  opposes  and  thwarts  the  process  of  its  development  is 
evil.  Thus  evil  is.  not  absolute  negation  of  good,  but  lack  of  some 
perfection.  Accordingly,  a  series  of  values,  of  good,  may  be  found 
in  every  beinir.  starting  inmi  its  first  and  imperfect  existence  and  end- 
ing with  its  last  stage  of  development  and  realization.  The  more  ade- 
(|uately,  then,  a  being  realizes  its  ideal,  the  more  entity  it  has,  the 
greater  is  its  good.  Now,  since  Being  and  (iood  are  one  and  the  same 
thing,  it  is  obvious  that  we  know  the  value  or  the  degree  of  perfection 
of  a  being,  when  we  possess  its  idea  ;  when  we  know  its  essence,  its  de- 
gree of  existence,  as  well  as  its  intrinsic  order  and  how  far  it  is  real- 
ized. Besides,  from  the  identity  of  Being  and  Good  it  may  be  con- 
cluded that  the  notion  whereby  both  are  known  by  us  is  the  same. 
Since,  according  to  Rosmini,  the  idea  of  being  is  the  origin  of  all  be- 
ings, it  follows  that  it  is  also  the  origin  of  all  goods;  and  as  it  is  the 
means  whereby  we  know  all  beings,  it  is  evident  that  it  is  also  the 
means  whereby  we  know  and  valuate  every  kind  of  good,  namely,  the 
good  which  satisfies  .some  agent,  or  subjective  good,  as  well  as  the 
good  which  is  independent  of  all  personal  and  empirical  motives,  and 
which  is  good  in  itself,  or  objective  good. 

From  the  fact  that  Being  and  CTOod  are  identical  Rosmini  finally 
infei-s  the  concept  of  Absolute  Good.  As  Absolute  Being  is  the 
being  which  has  the  whole  of  es.sence  within  itself,  so  also  Absolute 
Good  is  the  good  which  includes  the  whole  of  good.  The  Complete 
Being  is  the  Complete  Good,  which  lacks  nothing,  and  for  this 
rea.son  it  is  ab.solute.  The  Complete  Being,  however,  is  the  supreme 
good,  not  only  in  and  for  itself,  but  it  is  also  the  supreme  good  rela- 
tively to  particular  beings.  Rosmini  calls  the  complete  and  abso- 
lute Being,  which  is  by  the  same  fact  the  snpreme  and  absolute 
Good,  "God."  God,  therefore,  is  the  end  of  human  activity.  To 
become  one  with  ITim  is  the  high  destiny  of  man  as  rational  being." 

Now.  to  understand  Rosmini 's  point  of  view,  it  is  of  the  highest 
importance  to  notice  what  is  fundamental  in  his  ethical  theory.  He 
holds  that  everj'  real  individual,  realizing  his  own  es.sence,  does 
iiothing  but  realize  the  essence  of  being.  Since  this  partakes  of 
the  universal,  infinite,  necessary,  and  divine  essence,  it  partakes  of 
the  Absolute  Being,  of  God  Himself.  Bv  the  same  fact,  everv  real 
individual  by  realizing  good  partakes  of  the  Absolute  Good.     Thns 

cSee  "Principii,"  op.  cit.,  Ch.  III.,  a.  VII F. 


34  BOSMINI'S  CONTSIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  Absolute  Good  is  the  goal  of  rational  activity,  and  ought  to  be 
recognized  and  loved  wherever  found. 

Every  man,  therefore,  according  to  Rosmini,  as  rational  being, 
and  thus  partaking  of  God  Himself,  makes  a  moral  demand,  that 
is  to  say,  he  demands  to  be  recognized  and  loved,  because  of  his 
participation  in  the  Absolute  Being  and  Good.  The  essence  of 
morality,  then,  or,  the  ultimate  ground  of  every  moral  law,  of  every 
moral  obligation,  lies  in  the  respect  due  to  Infinite  Essence.  Ac- 
cordinglj'-,  the  principle  of  morality  may  be  formulated  in  the  fol- 
lowing law:  ''Recognize  the  essence  of  being  J'  But  to  recognize 
the  essence  of  being  is  the  same  as  to  recognize  its  goodness ;  we  can 
say  then  that  the  principle  of  morality  consists  in  the  practical 
recognition  of  every  being,  according  to  the  good  it  is  found  to 
possess,  that  is  to  say,  according  to  its  value  and  worth. 

Now,  since  the  essence  of  morality  is  identical  with  the  essence 
of  being,  it  must  be  endowed  with  the  same  characteristics.  Since 
the  essence  of  being  is  objective  (because  it  is  independent  of  every 
subject),  so  also  is  moral  good  or  the  essence  of  morality.  We  do 
not  create  it;  we  only  verify  it.  The  essential  law  of  pure  reason, 
according  to  Rosmini,  consists  in  grasping  being  in  itself,  so  also  the 
law  of  practical  reason  is  the  good  appreciated  in  itself,  or,  in  its 
intrinsic  and  objective  value,  not  according  to  the  merely  personal 
and  subjective  profit  which  may  derive  to  the  agent  from  his  faith- 
fulness to  duty.  Besides,  good  partakes  of  the  immutability  of 
Being;  its  stability  is  then  eternal.  The  good  which  is  object  of 
human  actions  is,  finally,  as  the  essence  of  being,  divine  and  infinite. 
God,  therefore,  ought  to  be,  according  to  our  philosopher,  the  focus 
of  thought  and  love,  the  satisfaction  of  man 's  intelligence  and  heart. 
Moreover,  since  the  principle  of  morality  and  obligation  consists 
in  the  practical  recognition  of  every  being,  according  to  its  essence 
and  goodness,  it  follows  that  we  must  distribute  our  love  among 
things  in  proportion  to  their  respective  grades  of  being,  and  prefer 
the  greater  to  the  lesser  grade.  ''I  must  prefer  my  country,"  says 
Rosmini,  ''to  my  life."  The  moral  law  says  absolutely:  "Sacrifice 
thyself  for  thy  country."^ 

But  here  it  may  be  asked:  How  can  man,  a  finite  being,  ascend 
to  the  knowledge  and  practical  recognition  of  the  essence  of  beings, 
which  is  infinite?  How  can  he  measure  the  degrees  of  entity? 
Wliat  is  the  first  and  supreme  rule  whereby  we  know  when  and  how 
the  principle  of  obligation  must  be  applied?  Rosmini  answers  that 
man  is  endowed  by  nature  with  the  intuition  of  the  essence  of  being. 
By  means  of  this  intuition,  he  is  fitted  to  know  and  measure  every 
essence  and  then  every  goodness.     Since  the  idea  of  being  is  the 

7  "Theodicy,"  No.  725. 


THE  METAPHYSICAL   FACTOR  OF  MORALITY  35 

supreme  rule  whereby  we  conceive  and  measure  the  entity  of  beings, 
and  con.se(iuently  the  objective  good,  or,  moral  good,  end  of  human 
actions,  the  ethical  formula  "Follow  the  litjht  of  reason,"  may  be 
translated  into  this  other:  "Follow  the  idea  of  good,  as  it  shoivs 
you  the  measure  of  the  entity  of  every  being/'  To  know  its  entity 
is  to  know  its  value,  its  worth,  its  dignity,  and  its  right  to  be  recog- 
nized for  what  it  is  and  to  be  loved  accordingly.** 

Thus,  according  to  Rosmini,  the  idea  of  being  is  the  ground  of 
ethical  judgments;  it  is  the  source  of  morality  and  obligation;  it  is 
the  metaphysical  basis  of  the  law  of  knowledge  and  action.  Epis- 
temolog}'  and  ethics  have  the  same  foundation,  independent  of  man's 
experience.     This  is  the  kernel  of  Rosmini 's  ethical  theory! 

8  "Theodicy,"  No.  725. 


CHAPTER  II 
The  Psychological  Factor  of  Morality 

The  whole  value,  the  whole  good,  of  beings  lies,  according  to 
Rosmini,  in  the  fact  that  beings,  realizing  their  own  essence,  partake 
of  the  infinite,  immutable,  and  absolute  essence  of  the  Supreme  Be- 
ing. Their  good,  however,  if  it  is  known  and  enjoyed  only  by  in- 
telligence, is  "objective  good." 

Intelligence  considers  them  in  themselves,  independently  of  every 
personal  interest,  of  every  empirical  motive,  and,  by  so  doing,  it 
attributes  to  them  that  which  really  belongs  to  them,  and  thus  it  does 
them  justice.  The  moral  good,  then,  can  not  be  anything  else  than 
the  objective  good.  And  the  supreme  moral  law,  the  whole  moral 
legislation  is  rooted  and  grounded  in  the  objective  good,  or,  in 
other  words,  in  the  Absolute  and  Eternal.  But  the  possibility  of 
man's  subordination  to  a  certain  law  depends  upon  its  promulga- 
tion. Man  must  have  knowledge  of  the  law  in  question ;  it  must  be 
present  in  his  mind  as  an  idea;  for  when  man  obeys  a  normative 
rule,  he  adjusts  his  rational  activity,  his  will,  to  it.  The  root  of 
human  activity  lies  in  knowledge  itself;  action  is  always  directed 
by  idea;  and  will  terminates  through  action  in  an  object  known  and 
set  before  it  by  intelligence.^ 

The  supreme  moral  law,  therefore,  or  the  objective  good,  must 
be,  indeed,  present  to  the  intelligence,  not  as  a  mere  object  of  con- 
templation. If  the  will  does  not  intervene  to  will  it,  after  having 
knowm  it,  objective  good  does  not  acquire  the  characteristic  of  moral 
good.  A  merely  speculative,  formal,  sterile  knowledge  of  the  good 
can  not  constitute  the  notion  of  moral  good.  When  the  agent  wills 
the  good  known  already  by  his  intelligence,  the  good  is  moral.  Thus 
the  moral  good  is,  according  to  Rosmini,  the  objective  good,  known 
by  the  intelligence  and  willed  by  the  will.^ 

The  quality  of  morality  is  simply  the  relation  of  the  objective 
good  to  the  intelligent  nature  willing  it.  Now,  Rosmini  thinks  that 
the  supreme  and  fundamental  law  of  morality  has  been  promul- 
gated to  man  from  the  early  dawn  of  his  life.  Since  the  idea  of 
being  is  the  light  of  reason  itself,  or  ''a  spark  of  the  divine  fire" 
which  enables  man  to  know  the  entity  of  beings,  it  performs  the 

1  "  Theodicy, "  Nos.  398,  631,  637,  644. 
2"Prmeipii,"  op.  cit.,      Ch.  IV.,  a.  VI. 

36 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  FACTOR  OF  MORALITY  37 

function  of  the  supreme  moral  law ;  since  it  is  innate,  it  follows 
that  we  carry  within  ourselves  the  germ  of  morals,  the  source  of 
the  whole  moral  legislation ;  we  bear  within  ourselves  the  reason  or 
will  of  God  Himself,  unceasingly  proclaiming  what  is  right. ^ 

Thus,  for  Rosmini.  the  fundamental  law  or  notion  of  morality  is 
not  the  outcome  of  the  course  of  experience,  but  something  imposed, 
originating  from  a  transcentlental,  invisible  authority.  The  mind 
is  merely  passive  when  it  receives  the  principle  of  morality,  as  it 
can  not  be  legislator  to  itself;  it  can  impo.se  no  norms,  no  standards 
of  action  on  itself.  Accordingly,  the  basis  and  justifying  principle 
of  the  ethical  judgment  lie  outside  of  the  mind  itself  in  transcen- 
dental conceptions,  or  considerations  that  do  not  result  from  human 
experience.  Our  philosopher  is  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  morality  can  not  be  empirically  acquired,  but  that  it  must 
be  implanted,  because  it  is  universal  and  categoric ;  it  is  truth  itself, 
whereas  experience,  however  repeated  and  multiplied,  never  gives 
anytiiing  more  than  particular  facts.* 

Rca.sons  and  laws  can  not  be  received  by  the  senses;  essentially 
unknown  to  sense,  they  are  manifest  only  to  rational  natures.^  The 
principle  of  morality  is,  therefore,  infused  into  our  reason.  Thus, 
it  is  abstract  and  .static ! 

But  Being  has,  for  Rosmini,  always  this  essential  characteristic, 
that  it  is  good,  and  hence  it  can  not  be  known  except  as  good.  Now, 
the  knowledge  of  it  as  good  implies  an  affection,  an  inclination 
toward  it.  Just  as  Being,  in  its  character  of  "light,"  creates  the 
intellect,  a  formal  cause  of  the  human  soul,  so  the  same  being,  in  its 
essential  character  of  "good,"  creates  the  "primitive  will,"  as  the 
final  cause  which  actuates  the  first  affection,  the  first  volition,  di- 
rected to  universal  being.  And  as  the  intellect  is  the  receptive 
power,  so  the  will  is  the  active  power  which  corresponds  to  it.  Now, 
according  to  our  philosopher,  the  intellect  has,  as  its  essential  object, 
ideal  being.  Being  is  immutable,  the  intellect,  then,  has  the  nature 
of  an  "immanent"  act  rather  than  of  a  power.  In  the  same  way 
it  may  be  said  that  the  primitive  and  universal  will  has  not  the 
nature  of  a  power,  but  of  an  immanent  act.  which  is  the  principle 
and  basis  of  power.  Hence  Rosmini  prefers  to  call  it  "primitive 
volition,"  in.stead  of  primitive  will." 

3  " Compcndio  di  etica."  Nos.  5.3,  .54;  "Theodicy,"  Nos.  5,  2.59.  262. 

*"Thcodirj-."  Nos.  13,8.  IM,  1.51.  2.5!). 

5  "Principii,"  op.  dt.,  Ch.  T.,  a.  III.  Rosmini  think.s  that  his  conception 
conforni5<  to  Marcus  Aurelius's  conception  of  fundamental  law.  "Hanc  video 
sapicnti.s.'timorum  fuissp  scntcntiam,  legem  neque  hominuvi  intjeniis  rnpHafam, 
nee  scitum  nliquod  ease  populorum,  sed  (uternum  quiddam,  quod  univcrsum  mun- 
dum  regeret,  imperandi,  prohibendiquc  sapicntia."     (*'De  Leg.,"  IT.) 

•  "Psychology,"  Nos.   1008-1011.     "The  immanent  act  is  that  which  en- 


38  HOSMINI'S  CONTSIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHT 

Man,  accordingly,  by  the  intuition  of  the  essence  of  the  uni- 
versal being,  is  enabled  to  know  the  essence  of  real  and  individual 
beings,  that  is  to  say,  their  value,  their  worth,  and  their  "claim"  to 
be  recognized  and  loved.  For  the  same  reason  he  has  a  natural  and 
spontaneous  predisposition  toward  the  universal  being  or  universal 
good.  And  since  the  moral  principle  imposes  adhesion  to  the  known 
entity  of  beings,  man  is  by  nature  predisposed  to  act  in  accordance 
with  the  fundamental  moral  law.  Such  a  force  which  tends  to  the 
whole  of  being,  to  universal  good,  may  be  called  "moral,"  because 
it  comes  from  being  and  goes  to  beiug.^ 

Thus  the  human  will  carries  within  itself  a  relation  of  con- 
formity to  the  first  and  eternal  law,  or  notion  of  being.  Man,  as  a 
real  being,  is  finite,  but  by  the  intuition  of  Being,  he  is  also  intel- 
lective and  moral,  and  partakes  of  the  infinite.  His  tendency,  how- 
ever, to  act  morally,  that  which  Rosmini  calls  "moral  liberty,"  in  so 
far  as  it  is  natural  and  spontaneous,  is  not  meritorious.  Man  is  neces- 
sitated to  act  with  moral  liberty,  that  is  to  say,  he  is  determined  to 
his  action,  not  by  external  cause,  but  by  his  inner  impelling  bent  to 
adhere  to  good  in  general.  This  natural  inclination  of  the  subject 
to  universal  good  is  what  constitutes  the  will  itself.'^ 

The  will,  regarded  as  such,  is  not  the  source  of  merit ;  it  deserves 
neither  praise  nor  blame.''  But  if  the  will  acts  in  accordance  with 
this  first  activity,  it  preserves  in  its  operation  an  order  altogether 
analogous  and  corresponding  to  the  order  of  being  itself,  and  by 
this  order  it  is  determined  to  act  with  moral  perfection.  This 
point  of  view  evidently  involves  a  deterministic  and  intellectualistic 
conception  of  the  will,  and  makes  the  decision  of  the  will  exclusively 
dependent  on  inner  insight. 

Does  it  mean  that  Rosmini  does  not  believe  in  the  freedom  of 
the  human  will?  Rosmini  believes  in  it,  and  gives  an  original  and 
interesting  analysis  of  it.  Liberty,  according  to  him,  springs  up 
at  a  certain  stage  of  the  psychic  process  of  action.  Doubtless  it 
does  not  intervene  in  the  intuition  of  the  essence  of  being,  since  this 
is  absolute  and  necessary.  This  essential  and  divine  power  is  given 
to  man  and  he  does  not  contribute  anything  to  it.  Nor  does  liberty 
intervene  in  the  spontaneous  and  immanent  tendency  which  the 

dures  with  a  being  so  long  as  no  substantial  change  supervenes  in  it. ' '     Ibid., 
1205. 

7  See  "Psychology,"  No.  896;  "Etiea,"  Nos.  514-525;  "Teosofia,"  No. 
1037.  Such  moral  force  is  called  by  Eosniini  " Preponderanza  morale."  It  is 
nothing  else  but  what  is  called  by  St.  Thomas  "Bonum  naturae,  scilicet  naturalis 
inclinatio  ad  virtutem,"  la,  Ilae,  q.  LXIII.  and  LXXXV.,  a.  I. 

8  See  "Teosofia,"  No.  1037;  "Etica,"  No.  29. 

9  Dante  expresses  the  identical  idea^  when  he  says,  ' '  Qiiesta  prima  voglia 
Merto  di  lode  o  di  iiasimo  non  cape. ' '     Purg.  XIXVIII.,  59,  60. 


THE  PSTCnOLOGICAL  FACTOR  OF  MOEALITT  39 

idea  of  being  or  the  liglit  of  reason  produces  in  the  will,  impellinf* 
it  to  adhere  to,  and  love,  all  entity  and  good.  It  may  be  said  that 
the  divine  craves  for  the  divine  which  is  found  in  every  intelligent 
being.  Liberty,  finally,  does  not  intervene  in  the  external  action, 
as  that  depends  on  the  will,  subordiiuited.  already,  to  a  certain  nor- 
mative rule,  and  determined  thereby.  The  role  of  free  will,  there- 
fore, the  merit  or  demerit  of  actions,  and  the  responsibility  of  the 
agent,  are  to  be  sought  elsewhere. 

Rosmini  thinks  that  man  is  endowcil  ns  ith  a  twofold  activity;  as 
an  intelligent  being  he  is  endowed  with  rational  activity;  as  a  real 
being  he  is  endowed  with  sensuous  activity.  Now,  if  he  were  merely 
intelligent,  if  he  could  shuffle  off  his  mortal  coil  of  animal  ([ualities, 
he  would  be  in  a  state  of  pure  intelligence ;  he  would  comnnuiicate 
with  beings  by  means  of  his  reason ;  he  would  perceive  their  whole 
entity  by  the  same  means,  and,  bj'  perceiving  their  entity,  he  would 
perceive  also  their  value,  their  good.  Such  transcendental  knowl- 
edge would,  of  course,  induce  a  universal  rational  love  for  all  beings ; 
such  universal  love  would  afford  intellectual  delight  to  man,  rid  of 
his  animality.  This  whole  process  would  be  spontaneous,  neces- 
sary, voluntary,  as  the  will  of  the  rational  luiture  would  then  follow 
its  own  natural  inclination.  Man,  therefore,  as  an  intelligent  being, 
would  always  act  morally,  namely,  according  to  his  natural  rational 
predisposition  toward  universal  being  and  good,  as  well  as  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  moral  demand  of  beings  to  be  recognized  and 
loved,  in  proportion  to  their  entity.  As  a  real  being,  however,  man 
is  endowed  with  feeling,  with  physical  qualities  and  needs;  in  other 
words,  he  feels  impelled  by  an  inner  physical  force  to  act  for  his 
own  satisfaction,  pleasure,  or  happiness. 

If  this  activity  which,  aims,  not  at  the  good  in  itself,  but  at  the 
good  of  the  agent,  could  be  naturally  conformed  with  the  rational 
and  immanent  activity,  the  freedom  of  the  will  would  be  useless. 
But  it  happens  that  both  activities  come  into  collision  and  seek  to 
determine  the  will  in  opposite  directions;  either  of  which  alone  would 
suffice  to  make  it  act.  At  this  crucial  stage,  the  objects  of  opposite 
order,  radically  different,  produce  two  kinds  of  volition.  Both 
volitions  are  possible;  as  the  one  may  determine  the  will  towards 
the  intellective  and  objective  good,  aiul  the  other  towards  the  sensi- 
tive and  subjective  good.  The  choice  between  the  two  possible  voli- 
tions is  free.  There  is  no  coercion.  Man  has.  according  to  Rosmini. 
the  power  of  making  one  volition  prevail  over  another,  and  thus  of 
determining  himself  to  action.  This  power  which  the  will  pos.sesses, 
is  called  by  Rosmini  "liberty  of  indifference,"  "bilateral-liberty," 
or  "meritorious  libcrtv." 


40  EOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

But  how  does  the  will  display  such  a  power?  How  does  one 
volition  prevail  over  another?  How  is  the  choice  between  two  con- 
trary volitions  brought  about?  Rosmini  holds  that  the  will  is  a 
power  which  acts  in  accordance  with  the  reasons  that  man  has  in 
his  mind  and  proposes  to  himself.  Whence  we  may  conclude  that 
the  will  can  not  operate  unless  man  has  reasons  or  knowledge,  ac- 
cording to  which  he  might  deliberate,  choose,  and  will.  The  reason 
or  motive,  however,  does  not  determine  the  will. 

The  determining  force,  the  power  of  free  choice,  or  "liberty," 
lies  within  the  agent  himself.  Liberty  affords  the  agent,  in  the 
presence  of  several  motives,  the  power  of  making  one  motive  prevail 
over  all  others  so  that  the  predominating  motive  determines  the  will 
to  act." 

Rosmini,  however,  does  not  mean  that  a  motive  might  have  the 
force  of  directing  choice.  According  to  him,  there  are  two  kinds 
of  cognition.  The  first  cognition  of  things  is  direct,  immediate,  in- 
stinctive, necessary,  and  so  not  voluntary.  Through  it  we  are  fur- 
nished with  ideas  of  thicgs.  The  understanding  forms  perceptions, 
and  such  ideas  as  are  consequent  on  these,  in  an  instinctive  and 
natural  manner,  and,  for  tliat  reason  it  is  not  liable  to  error,  for 
nature  does  not  err.  Through  this  first  intellective  apprehension 
we  perceive  the  thing  in  its  entirety,  by  a  simple  act,  as  if  it  were  a 
simple  object.  Thus,  the  direct  cognition  is  purely  synthetic;  it  is 
the  primitive,  spontaneous  synthesis  of  being  and  sensation.  Let 
us  notice  that  in  perceiving  the  things  as  a  whole,  we  have  no  in- 
terest to  perceive  them  in  one  manner  rather  than  in  another.  We 
are  then  merely  passive.^^ 

Besides,  we  must  notice  that  in  perceiving  the  entity  of  beings, 
we  have  a  conception  of  their  value.  Accordingly,  direct  cognition 
enables  our  theoretical  reason  to  make  speculative  judgments  and 
acquire  speculative  knowledge.  The  first  ideas,  however,  by  which 
we  know  things  are  for  Rosmini  equally  indifferent ;  they  have,  in 
other  words,  not  purposive,  but  representative  character  only.  Thus 
Rosmini  fails  to  notice  that  all  our  consciousness  is  dynamogenic, 
and  that  an  idea  is  a  nascent  act.  Our  philosopher,  however,  thinks 
that  the  need  of  action  impels  the  will  to  reflection,  that  is  to  say, 
to  turn  back  upon  what  we  before  perceived  directly  and  involun- 
tarily; it  urges  the  rational,  active  power  to  analyze,  decompose, 
and  consider  previous  and  direct  cognitions. 

This  process  of  reflection,  of  analysis,  which  is  thoroughly  volun- 
tary and  practical  involves  a  ''practical  evaluation"  or  "judgment" 

10  ' '  Antropologia, ' '  Ch.  VII. 

11  See  "New  Essay  on  the  Origin  of  Ideas,"  Vol.  III..  Nos.  1258,  1259, 
1261;  "Principii,"  op.  cit.,  Ch.  V.,  a.  III. 


THE   PSYCnOLOGICAL    FACTOR    OF   MORALITY  41 

of  the  things,  known  already  throu^rh  previous,  immediate  cogni- 
tion. At  tliis  stage  the  will  displays  its  power  of  liberty.  For  it  is 
free  to  appreciate  and  recognize  things  as  they  are  in  cognition  and 
to  adhere  to  their  entity  as  known,  as  it  is  free  to  alter  their  value 
by  arbitrarily  increasing  or  diminishing  for  itself  the  degrees  of 
being  or  entity,  thus  substituting  another  entity,  feigned  and  created 
by  the  energy  of  its  own  caprice.  The  volitional  activity  then  mani- 
fests itself  by  "recognition,"  either  simple  or  fictitious.  It  implies, 
indeed,  a  previous  cognition  as  well  as  no  alteration  of  its  object. 
This  voluntary  recognition  is  an  assent  to  immediate  cognition;  it 
is  true,  just,  moral,  if  the  will,  in  i-ecognizing  the  previously  known 
entity,  does  not  alter  its  value,  but  is  content  with  that  measure  of 
value  which  direct  cognitinn  prescribes.  On  the  contrary,  it  is 
unjust  and  immoral,  if  the  will  assumes  that  the  entity  of  things  is 
different  from  the  one  contained  in  the  direct  cognition,  and  thus 
estimates  it  at  more  or  at  less  than  its  true  worth,  recognizing  it  as 
what  it  is  not.  not  as  what  it  is. 

This  practical  force  of  arbitrary  evaluation  is  simjily  the  reason 
which  prevails  and  determines  the  choice.  Without  the  practical 
force  there  is  no  determination,  but  a  mere  inclination  which  does 
not  end  in  choice.  Thus,  given  the  case  in  which  each  of  two  voli- 
tions has  in  its  favor  a  reason  of  equal  weight,  the  free  will  can.  by 
increasing  the  force  of  the  reason  which  is  favorable  to  it,  choose  one 
rather  than  the  other.  Whence  Rosmini  concludes  that  the  will  may 
conform  its  activity  to  its  moral  liberty  or  to  the  moral  claim  of 
beings,  and  thus  to  the  good,  or  to  the  opposite,  and  thus  be  unjust 
and  evil.'- 

He  notices,  besides,  that  practical  esteem  produces  a  "practical 
love."  We  act  because  we  are  impelled  by  a  practical  love  which 
prevails  over  other  loves.  We  are  free  to  will  or  not  to  will  actions, 
because  we  are  free  to  love  or  not  to  love  them,  to  increase  or  di- 
minish our  love  or  our  hatred  of  this  or  that  action.  This  power 
of  ours  which  is  called  liberty  is  practised  first  on  the  affections  of 
our  heart,  and  through  it  on  tlie  actions  themselves. 

But  when  we  love  a  thing,  we  love  it  because  we  consider  it  good ; 
we  may,  indeed,  love  something  evil,  but  when  we  do  so,  we  love  it 
"suh  specie  honi."  Thus,  the  intrinsic  nature  of  love  involves 
esteem  of  the  object  loved;  our  personal  valuation  is  a  factor  in  our 
own  loving." 

To  sum  up;  the  process  of  the  moral  act,  according  to  Rosmini, 

i»See  "Psychology."  No.  llO.'i;  "  Antropolopia,"  Nos.  (536-64.^;  "The- 
odicy," No.  621;  "Etica,"  Ch.  III.,  a.  I.,  II.,  III.;  "Principii,"  op.  cit., 
Ch.  V. 

13  See  "Principii,"  op.  cit..  Hi.  V.,  a.  TIT. 


I 


I 


42  EOSMINI'S  CONTEIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

is  as  follows:  we  first  have  ideas  and  memories  of  things;  we  have 
direct  and  necessary  cognitions:  we  see  things  as  they  are.  After 
the  will  provokes  the  reflection  upon  these  things  known,  this  volun- 
tary reflection  is  just  or  unjust,  according  as  it  tends  to  recognize 
faithfully  the  direct  cognition,  or  to  alter  it.  The  agent,  during 
voluntary  reflection,  concentrates  his  attention,  or  meditates,  upon 
the  immediate  cognition.  Out  of  this  voluntary  meditation  springs 
a  keen  and  active  apprehension,  which  is  true  or  false,  according  as 
the  act  of  the  will,  directing  reflection,  was  right  or  perverse.  The 
apprehension  ends  in  a  practical  judgment  or  esteem.  The  prac- 
tical valuation  produces  an  intellectual  delight  or  sorrow.  Such  a 
delight  is  the  beginning  of  the  love  that  immediately  follows  it  as 
its  completion  and  end,  as  such  a  sorrow  is  the  beginning  of  the 
hatred  that  immediately  follows  it  as  its  mark  and  fulfilment. 

The  external  action  is  the  last  stage  of  the  complex  psychic 
process  which  the  will  instigates,  under  the  pressure  of  action,  carry- 
ing out  its  power  of  liberty.  Liberty,  then,  according  to  Rosmini, 
consists  in  self-determination;  the  will  uses  its  power  of  free  choice 
between  volitions,  categorically  different,  only  when  there  is  con- 
flict between  subjective  and  objective  good,  that  is  to  say,  between 
duty,  virtue,  moral  law,  and  pleasure,  satisfaction,  happiness,  or, 
in  other  words,  between  the  ideal  and  the  real,  the  infinite  and  finite. 
Accordingly,  it  must  be  the  law  of  the  rational  principle  to  consider 
the  value  of  being  in  itself,  independently  of  the  accidental  and  real 
action  which  it  exercises  on  the  rational  subject.  That  value  must, 
therefore,  be  measured  by  ideal  being,  and  not  by  considerations  of 
subjective  advantage  and  disadvantage,  and  must  be  estimated  by 
comparison  with  ideal  being.  Our  practical  reason  must  not  esti- 
mate its  object  at  a  different  value  from  that  which  it  has  in  itself 
considered  with  respect  to  ideal  being.  It  must  act  in  view  of  the 
true  measure  of  that  object  discovered  by  comparison  with  the  es- 
sence of  being  intuited  by  the  mind  in  universal-ideal  being.  To 
act  according  to  this  measure  is  to  act  rationally  and,  hence,  mor- 
ally; to  act  from  the  mere  impulse  of  the  real  action  which  an  object 
exercises  on  us,  is  to  abandon  the  law  of  reason,  to  follow  that  of 
blind,  or  merely  sensible,  real  being.  To  act  morally,  in  other  words, 
we  must  direct  our  actions  to  being,  as  it  is  their  natural  end ;  thus 
we  must  forget  ourselves  and  objectify  ourselves  in  being,  or  in 
the  object  of  our  activity,  as  intelligent  beings.  And  as  the  object 
of  our  rational  and  moral  actions  is  the  Infinite,  we  must  merge  our- 
selves in  the  Infinite,  Supreme  Being,  the  Absolute  Good.  AVlien 
we  love  a  thing,  when  we  think  of  it,  we  do  nothing  but  bring  our- 
selves into  the  same  thing  as  term  of  our  love  and  thought,  and  forget 


THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL    FACTOR    OF    MOLALITY  43 

and,  in  a  sense,  annihilate  ourselves.  That  is  what  Rosmini  wants 
us  to  do  before  the  objective,  infinite,  moral  good,  the  goal  of  onr 
rational  aetivity.^^  By  so  doing,  we  perform  a  voluntary  recogni- 
tion of  what  we  first  necessarily  know;  we  welcome  the  good  of  the 
things  we  have  perceived;  we  recognize  what  is  true.  nay.  truth  it- 
self; and  thus  we  subordinate  ourselves  to  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple of  moralit}';  we  ai"e  inoi-ally  ^'ood  and  acfoinplish  our  supreme 
duty. 

Now,  since  the  principle  of  cognition  which  constitutes  the  su- 
preme law,  according  to  which  tiie  theoretic  reason  operates,  sup- 
plies, likewise,  the  law,  according  to  whidi  the  practical  reason  ouglit 
to  operate,  it  follows  that  if  the  law  of  tin'  theoretic  reason  says: 
"Being  is  the  object  of  knowing,''  the  law  of  the  practical  reason 
says:  "Being  ought  to  be  object  of  practical  knowing.""^ 

Let  us  notice  here  that  Rosmini 's  endeavors  to  distinguish  reason 
into  theoretical  and  practical  have  proved  to  be  vain.  He  does  not, 
indeed,  regard,  like  Kant,  the  theoretical  reason  and  the  practical 
reason  as  two  faculties  radically  different.'"  lie  thinks  that  there 
is  but  one  rational  principle,  which  in  so  far  as  it  knows  is  called 
"theoretic,"  and  in  so  far  as  it  acts  is  called  "practical."  But  he 
identifies  them  dc  facto.  And,  indeed,  since  speculative  reason  is 
constituted  by  the  intuition  of  being  in  general,  since  the  practical 
reason  is  the  same  recognition  of  the  essence  of  beings,  and  since 
good,  the  term  of  the  practical  reason,  and  being,  the  terra  of  pure 
reason,  are  one  and  the  same  thing,  inasmuch  as  they  are  con- 
vertible terms,  it  follows  that  both  pure  and  practical  reason  have 
the  same  object  and  term ;  there  is  no  conflict  between  them ;  they 
are  not  distinct,  but  are  one  reason,  one  instrument  of  activity;  and 
thus  the  rational  principle  which  is  found  in  man  is  for  practise, 
action,  life. 

jNIoreover,  let  us  notice  that  Rosmini.  making  morality  dependent 
only  upon  knowledge,  fails  to  consider  man  in  his  totality,  as  he  neg- 
lects to  pay  attention  to  the  life  of  feeling  which,  as  well  as  the  life 
of  reason,  claims  to  be  a  basis  of  ethical  judging. 

Finally,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  to  notice  that  Rosmini 
derives  the  conception  of  human  dignity  from  the  fact  that  man  is 
endowed  with  the  intuition  of  Being,  whereby  he  is  enabled  to  ])er- 
eeive,  recognize,  and  love  the  entity  of  beings,  and,  since  their  entity 
is  nothing  but  participation  in  the  Absolute,  it  follows  that  man  is 

i«  " PsTchology, "  No.  1429;  "Theodicy."  Nos.  384-415;  "Teosofia."  II.; 
"PrJncipii,"  op.  dt.,  Ch.  V. 

i5'<PsycholoKi',"  No.  1399. 
16 See  "Theodicy,"  No.  161. 


44  BOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

enabled  to  know,  recognize,  and  love  the  Infinite,  the  Absolute,  or 

God  Himself. 

Besides,  the  light  of  reason,  with  which  man  is  by  nature  en- 
dowed, is  participation  in  God's  light.  It  is,  for  Rosmini  as  for 
Flavins  Justin,  the  natural  revelation  of  the  divine  and  "germinant 
Logos."  Thus,  man  partakes  of  God's  dignity.  Accordingly,  he 
can  not  be  regarded  as  a  means,  but  only  as  an  end." 

"See  "Principii,"  op.  cit.,  Ch.  III.,  a.  IX.;  Ch.  IV.,  a.  VIII.  and  IX.; 
"Storia  comparativa,"  Ch.  I.,  a.  III.;  "Teosofia,"  No.  831;  "Etica,"  Nos. 
98,  99,  102-104. 


CONCLUSION 

The  theory  of  ideal  being  is  the  basis  of  Rosmiiii's  vast  philo- 
sophical edifiee;  it  is  the  unifying  faetor  in  his  whole  system  of 
thought;  it  is  the  starting  point  of  every  philosophical  problem  lie 
confronts  and  discusses,  as  well  as  of  his  theory  of  ethics.  His 
entire  philosophy,  then,  stands  and  falls  with  the  doctrine  of  being. 

The  fundamental  error  in  Rosmini's  system  of  philosophy  and  of 
ethics  lies  in  his  method.  He  begins  with  the  universal  or  idea,  and 
attempts  to  descend  to  the  particular  or  the  phenomenal.  Thus  he 
begins  with  an  a  priori  element,  with  a  theory  of  what  is  prior  to 
every  experien  ?,  with  the  highest  abstraction,  since  the  idea  of 
being  is  one  of  the  last  terms  of  our  intellectual  elaboration  that 
supposes,  indeed,  a  series  of  previous  operations.  Now,  to  assume 
an  abstraction,  as  the  starting  point  of  knowledge,  is  to  assume  a 
psychological  and  epistemological  impossibility.  Positive  facts  con- 
stitute the  beginning  of  human  knowledge.  Something  abstract, 
extra-empirical,  can  not  be  the  object  of  experience,  of  idealization, 
of  desire,  of  interest,  as  it  has  no  value,  no  meaning  for  life,  and 
consequently  it  can  be  neither  stimulus  nor  response  to  any  need  or 
demand.  The  function  of  thinking  is  aroused  by  the  presence  of 
some  object,  which  involves  reaction  or  adjustment. 

It  can  not  be  denied,  indeed,  that  every  judgment  iinplit's  the 
notion  of  being,  but  we  can  not  from  this  fact  conclude  that  the 
idea  of  being  exists  within  our  mind,  prior  to  all  experience,  and 
that  it  may  be  the  main  factor  of  all  our  intellectual  development. 
The  substitution  of  idea  for  fact,  of  intuition  for  perception,  is  an 
arbitrary  and  unscientific  substitution.  In  fact,  how  can  we  pass 
from  the  mere  notion  of  being  to  real  being,  from  a  mere  abstract 
form  of  our  mind  to  life?  What  bridges  the  gulf  between  the  ideal 
and  the  real?  According  to  Hegel  it  is  "becoming";  according  to 
Gioberti  it  is  "creation";  according  to  Rosmini  it  is  an  uncontrolled 
synthesis  between  perception  aiul  ideal  being. 

Ro.smini  endeavors,  indeed,  to  solve  the  diflieulty  by  holding  that 
the  idea  of  possil)le  being,  indeterminate  in  itself,  is  determined  by 
the  act  of  perception,  and  thus  it  becomes  the  idea  of  a  real  being. 

But  such  a  postulate  is  not  at  all  justified,  and  contains  contra- 
dictory affirmations.  Tlie  idea  of  a  possible  being,  as  it  is  sim|)le 
and  indeterminate,  can  not  uiulergo  the  slightest  change  or  modifi- 
cation, without  being  no  longer  what  it  was,  without  annihilating 

45 


46  EOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

itself,  for  the  sake  of  being  replaced  by  a  new  idea.  Thus  the  latter 
would  not  be  a  transformation,  but  a  suppression  of  the  first. 

The  phenomenon  of  perception  proves  to  be  impossible  in  Ros- 
mini's  psychological  theory.  Perception  is  an  act  of  adjustment  of 
the  organism  to  the  environment,  and  we  do  not  need  any  abstrac- 
tion as  means  of  performing  such  a  biological  function. 

Besides,  let  us  remark  against  Rosmini's  theory  of  knowledge 
what  Aristotle  noticed  against  that  of  Plato,  that  is  to  say  that  our 
knowledge  does  not  begin  with  universal,  since  our  knowledge  of 
the  individual  precedes  our  knowledge  of  the  universal.^ 

Moreover,  Rosmini,  following  Plato,  hypostatizes  the  universal, 
attributing  to  it  a  separate  existence,  characterized  by  immutability 
and  eternity.  But  we  may  object  to  Plato  as  well  as  to  Rosmini  that 
the  universal  can  not  exist  apart  from  the  individual,  since,  if  it  did 
so,  the  transition  from  a  knowledge  of  the  one  to  a  knowledge  of 
the  other  would  be  impossible.  Finally,  Rosmini  holds  the  uni- 
versal to  be  ready-made,  apart  from  phenomena,  while  we  may  say 
that  the  formal  aspect  of  universality  is  a  production  of  the  mind, 
and,  therefore,  the  universal,  as  such,  does  not  exist  in  individual 
things,  but  in  the  mind  alone.  It  seems  to  be  arbitrary  to  derive 
the  universal  from  a  transcendental  entity  as  Rosmini  does.  I  can 
not  help  regarding  as  a  mere  chimera  the  belief  in  anj'-  abstract  idea, 
containing  intelligible  essence,  and  conditioning  and  determining, 
as  an  eternal  archetype,  reality,  the  data  of  experience  which  is 
concrete,  particular,  and  determined  in  space  and  time. 

To  believe  in  such  a  thing  is  to  believe  that  human  science  may 
be  severed  into  two  orders  of  objects,  absolutely  distinct,  and  having 
no  other  relation  than  a  kind  of  parallelism  in  their  development. 
The  abstract  and  the  concrete  are  characterized  by  profound  dif- 
ferences, but,  in  spite  of  those  differences,  both  are  products  of  ex- 
perience. 

But  Rosmini's  final  motive  was  that  of  Plato,  and  he  felt  it 
necessary  to  assume  the  same  rationalistic  attitude,  and  to  base  his 
ethics  upon  metaphysical,  or  rather  mythical  epistemology.  He,  as 
well  as  Plato,  thought  that  the  knowledge  in  which  virtue  is  to  con- 
sist must  be  the  cognition  of  what  is  truly  real,  as  opposed  to  opin- 
ions which  may  be  only  relative,  and  dependent  on  phenomena,  on 
empirical  and  subjective  motives,  thus  compromising  true  knowledge 
and  morals.  The  leading  motive  of  both  philosophers  proved  to  b*» 
ethico-social,  since  both  wanted  to  check  the  moral  disintegration  of 
their  countries  and  to  lift  up  the  moral  standard  of  national  life 
by  indicating  moral  conduct  as  factor  of  true  happiness,  individual 
as  well  as  social.     Thus  the  common  ideal  of  their  philosophical  en- 

1  "Eth.  Nic,"  VI.,  II.,  11-13,  b5. 


CONCLUSION  47 

deavors  was  to  win  true  virtuo  by  true  kiiowlod<]:o.  So  I  think  that 
Kosinini  assumed  as  thesis  of  his  epistemologfieal  and  metaphysical 
doctrine  of  ethics,  the  thesis  discussed,  in  a  special  way,  in  IMato's 
Meno.- 

Phito  was  convinced  that  the  fundamental  principle  of  morals 
was  exposed  to  the  danger  of  contiiuious  change  by  the  Protagorean 
doctrhie  of  relativity.  He  thou^dit,  accordingly,  that  as  Socrates 
had  fii-st  taught,  virtue  is  knowleilge,  and  knowledge  of  the  good. 
But  he  thought,  moreover,  that  the  absolute  truth  of  conceptual 
knowledge  consists  in  the  fact  that  it  conc(>ivcs  in  the  idea  the  true 
being,  iiulepentlent  of  every  change. 

Rosmini,  like  Parmenides,  Socrates,  and  Plato,  wanted  to  place 
rea.son  in  opposition  to  opinion;  he  thought  that  sensationalism  and 
empiricism,  whii'h  were  the  prevalent  currents  of  piiilosophical 
thought  in  Italy  at  that  time  of  national  becoming,  compromised  or 
nullified  the  fundamental  principles  of  epistemology  and  ethics. 
Accordingly,  identifying  being  with  good,  in  a  Euclidean  manner, 
presupposed  a  changeless  supreme  idea  in  man,  as  the  rational 
measure,  rule,  and  end  of  human  actions,  as  it  is  also  the  funda- 
mental source  of  epistemological  and  ethical  law.  lie  intciulcd 
thereby  to  furnish  the  new  national  life  with  a  basis  eternally  im- 
mune to  change ;  he  intended  to  respond  to  the  need  of  new  ideals, 
of  new  intellectual  beauty,  which  the  revival  of  Christian  ideals 
and  the  influence  of  romanticism  brought  into  every  province  of  life. 

Rosmini,  as  well  as  Scotus  Erigina.  making  the  individual  de- 
pendent upon  the  universal,  meant  to  subordinate  all  the  particular 
forces  to  the  almighty  authority  of  the  Supreme  Being,  and  of  the 
Cluirch.  He  intended,  indeed,  to  focus  the  minds  of  the  oppressed 
Italians  as  well  of  the  oppressors  of  that  time  and  of  all  time,  upon 
an  inexhaustible  .source  of  truth  and  justice,  (juite  independent  of 
all  circumstances  and  motives.  That  is  the  reason  why  he  does  not 
account  for  the  dynamic,  progressive  character  of  morality,  and 
thinks  the  moral  life  to  be  a  changeless  structure.  He,  moreover, 
intended  to  say  that  duties  and  rights  undergo  no  change,  as  the 
moral  order  does  not  depend  upon  the  will  and  the  caprices  of  men, 
but  upon  the  Absolute,  Eternal,  Supreme  Being. 

The  unchangeable  moral  principle  consists  in  the  practical  recog- 
nition of  the  entity  or  the  good,  partaken  of  by  im-n.  oi-.  in  other 
words,  in  the  love  for  all  who  enjoy  the  divine  within  themselves. 
Such  an  idea,  while  it  suggested  reciprocal  love  and  union  to  the 
groaning  hearts  of  the  Italians,  kindled  also  their  ardent  desire  for 
political  cmatn'ipation.     The  fundamental  moral   law.  divine  in   its 

-See  "  rhacilo, "  ami  "Republic,''  especially  Books  IV.  and  V. 


48  BOSMINI'S  CONTRIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

origin  and  nature,  imposed  on  the  oppressor's  recognition  of,  and 
veneration  for,  human  dignity. 

Human  rights  are  sacred  as  duty  is  sacred.  Since  justice  is 
grounded  in  God's  will,  Rosmini  meant  that  Italy's  political  de- 
liverance and  unity  were  God's  will  as  well.  Thus  the  Italian  philos- 
opher indirectly  intended  to  foster  the  national  aspirations  of  his 
compatriots  and  to  help  modify  their  political  and  social  situation. 

But  the  principle  upon  which  Rosmini  endeavored  to  build  his 
system  of  ethics,  although  clothed  with  rational  form,  is  religious 
and  theological,  and,  therefore,  more  adapted  to  moral  theology  than 
to  scientfic  ethics.  A  scientific  theory  of  ethics  can  not  be  grounded 
upon  an  abstract  and  mystical  presupposition,  since  what  is  outside 
phenomena  is,  by  the  same  fact,  outside  the  control  of  reason  and 
experience,  and  can  not  be  verified.  The  belief  in  an  a  priori,  tran- 
scendental principle  of  morality  involves  denial  of  continuity  in 
moral  experience,  not  rational  subordination,  and  hence  the  im- 
possibility of  scientific  inquiry.  For  ethics,  then,  would  only  ex- 
plain how  to  execute,  how  to  carry  out  absolute  and  fixed  ideals  of 
conduct,  while  its  function,  as  science,  is  to  organize  experimental 
results,  and  to  show  how  man,  free  from  every  preoccupation,  con- 
tributes in  the  creation  of  moral  ideals.  And  man  is  enabled  to 
say  what  is  really  good,  or  worth  while  in  conduct,  only  by  means  of 
personal  or  racial  experience.  An  ethics,  truly  human  and  scien- 
tific, since  it  exists  precisely  for  the  sake  of  man  who  lives  and  works 
in  the  world  of  phenomena  and  experience,  can  not  have  a  basis 
lying  outside  all  experience,  unless  it  renounces  a  scientific  stand- 
point, and  is  satisfied  to  be  mere  casuistry  or  dialectics.  Moreover, 
Rosmini  holds  as  supreme  ethical  formula  the  practical  recognition 
of  being  in  its  order.  If  such  practical  recognition  were  the  out- 
come of  man,  regarded  in  his  totality,  that  is  to  say  in  his  heart  and 
intelligence,  we  could  use  it  as  a  leading  measure  of  the  worth  and 
good  of  beings,  as  well  as  for  a  rule  of  actions. 

But  Rosmini,  following  Kant,  thought  that  there  is  an  antithesis 
between  the  intelligible  and  the  phenomenal  world.  He,  as  well  as 
Kant,  attempted  to  discover  for  ethics  a  rational  foundation,  inde- 
pendent of  the  world  of  phenomena.  Both  thought  that  experience 
is  conditioned,  while  the  moral  law  must  be  unconditioned,  and  its 
origin  then  must  be  independent  of  all  experience.  Both  thought 
that  all  feeling  is  empirical,  sensuous,  egoistic,  and  can  afford  no 
foundation  for  the  moral  law. 

Thus,  both  disregarded  the  life  of  feeling  and  emotion,  which 
claims  to  build  moral  ideals  in  the  process  of  human  experience. 
Both  have  the  same  conception  of  the  fundamental  problem  of  ethics, 


CONCLUSION  49 

and  beg:in,  not  with  an  original  unity,  but  with  a  duality.  Kant 
begins  with  the  spontaneity  and  receptivity  of  the  mind,  while  Ros- 
mini  begins  with  the  idea  of  being  and  sensation.  Such  being,  of 
which  man  has  an  immediate  and  intuitive  vision,  has,  according 
to  Rosmini,  an  objective  value.  But  Rosmini  does  not  prove  the  ob- 
jective validity  of  the  internal  intuitive  knowledge. 

We  may,  accordingly,  say  that  his  "being"  is  nothing  else 
than  the  subjective  thought  itself  in  its  extreme  abstraction.  Tims, 
he  does  not  begin  witli  God.  but.  as  Kant,  with  the  human  mind 
it.self.3 

Besides,  since  Rosmini  denies  to  iuiman  mind  the  complete  com- 
prehension of  the  pure  Being,  and  since  he  thus  implicitly  denies 
the  possibility  of  deducing  from  it  all  the  determinations  of  being, 
it  follows  that  the  pure  being  intuited  by  the  mind  is  not  the  true, 
pure  being,  namely,  God,  but  merely  the  being  abstracted  from  re- 
flection.* 

Rosmini,  however,  does  not  agree  with  Kant  in  some  other 
points.  According  to  Kant,  for  instance,  man  is  at  once  law-giver 
and  subject.  According  to  Rosmini,  man  can  not  impose  laws  on 
him.self.  as  .such  an  action  presupposes  authority,  and  hence  he  can 
not  be  legislator  to  him.self.  Moral  conceptions,  according  to  Kant, 
are  gained  from  pure  reason  itself.  Rosmini  thinks  that  the  funda- 
mental law  can  not  be  derived  from  our  own  reason,  but  that  it  is  given, 
and  man  is  passive,  Kant  holds  that  duty  springs  neither  from 
authority,  nor  from  experience.  Rosmini  is  thoroughly  convinced 
that  the  .source  of  duty  is  transcendental,  that  is  to  say,  it  is  God. 
For  Kant  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  ethical  is  autonomy :  for 
Rosmini  heteronomy.  The  dignity  of  liuman  personality,  accord- 
ing to  Kant,  depends  on  man's  capacity  for  autonomy,  or  on  his 
capacity  for  following  the  universal  law,  derived  from  his  own  rea- 
son;  according  to  Rosmini,  the  dignity  of  human  personality  lies  in 
the  immediate  intuition  of  being,  in  the  participation  of  divine  es- 
sence by  means  of  the  light  of  reason,  and,  finally,  in  man's  natural 
capacity  to  incline  to.  and  to  merge  him.self  in,  God,  source  of  moral 
good  and  happiness. 

If  we  examine  more  particularly  the  moral  edifice  wliich  Ros- 
mini intended  to  build  in  those  moments  of  intense  national  move- 
ment, we  find  that  liberty,  according  to  him.  is  an  act  merely  intel- 
lective; that  is,  not  an  act  of  mere  contemplation,  but  an  act  of 
assenting  contemplation.     But  is  not  this  a  metaphysical  hypothesis 

3 Sec  Spaventa,  "La  filosofia  di  Kant  e  Rosmini,"  pages  47-t8;  Fiorentino, 
"La  filosofia  contemporanoa  in  Italia,"  page  23. 

♦See  A.  Franchi,  "Ultima  Critica,"  page  116;  R.  Benzoni,  "Dottrina  dell- 
Essere  nel  sistema  rosminiano. " 


50  BOSMINI'S  CONTBIBUTION  TO  ETHICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

without  any  true  ground?  If  the  assent  to  contemplated  being  is 
a  mere  business  of  the  intelligence,  under  the  pressure  of  the  idea 
of  being  (which  is,  according  to  Rosmini,  leading,  ruling,  informing 
our  rational  life),  does  it  not  follow  that  the  will  is  thoroughly  de- 
termined a  priori?  Rosmini  is  mistaken  in  considering  exclusively 
in  man  the  intellective  factor,  making  it  the  unique  factor  of  all 
our  inner  events,  and  subordinating  all  our  psychic  activity  to  it. 
Conscious,  however,  of  the  necessity  of  accounting  in  the  process 
of  moral  action  for  the  active  power  of  feeling,  and  anxious  to 
explain  the  passage  from  idea  to  act,  he  discovered  the  practical 
love  which  he  supposes  to  precede  the  realization  of  the  will.  It  is 
an  impelling  force,  but  the  intellect  is,  according  to  our  philosopher, 
the  acting  force.  But  is  there  any  volitional  act  which  is  not  ac- 
companied by  feeling?  Is  there  any  act  of  the  human  will  which 
is  not  at  the  same  time  conscious,  and  that,  as  object  of  conscious- 
ness, does  not  involve  a  condition,  either  agreeable  or  disagreeable? 
Consciousness  of  an  object  implies  not  only  some  mental  presenta- 
tion of  the  object,  but  also  some  subject  to  whom  it  is  presented. 
The  object  may  or  may  not  appeal  to  the  "whole"  subject,  not 
only  to  his  intelligence,  but  to  his  impulsive  and  emotive  life  as  well. 
If  it  appeals,  it  can  not  fail  to  arouse  interest  and  desire  and  agree- 
able emotion.  If  it  does  not  appeal,  it  stimulates  aversion,  and  its 
consequent  emotions.  Rosmini  fails  to  recognize  that  our  psychic 
life  is  unique,  coexistent  with  its  factors,  intimately  inter-connected. 

The  life  of  intelligence  and  the  life  of  feeling  can  not  be  viewed 
apart  without  renouncing  the  great  discoveries  of  modern  psychol- 
ogy. We  can  not,  accordingly,  conceive,  as  Rosmini  does,  the  prac- 
tical judgment  as  determined  by  mere  ideas  and  abstract  relations; 
for  it  is  the  anticipated  representation  of  an  act  and  hence  has  re- 
lation alike  to  sensibility,  intelligence,  and  impulse.  Such  a  repre- 
sentation can  not  fail  to  be  accompanied  by  some  emotion,  with  some 
active  and  motor  reaction.  Has  not  even  the  most  ideal  speculation 
an  active  side?  Have  not  material  representations  as  well  as  the 
most  lofty  speculations  some  relation  to  our  emotive  life?  Have 
they  not  all  some  value  for  our  personality?  And  since  they  have 
some  value,  some  relation  to  our  entire  life  why  must  moral  judg- 
ments, which  are  quite  practical,  and  in  which  mind  and  heart  are 
interested,  be  regarded  as  isolated  from  our  daily  life  ? 

Finally,  moral  good,  according  to  Rosmini,  corresponds  to  Being, 
made  possible,  indeed,  by  its  relation  to  feeling,  but  subsistent  in 
itself,  independent  of  the  feeling  subject  which  apprehends  it.  If 
good,  for  man,  is  possible  only  in  relation  to  feeling,  how  can 
Rosmini  hold  such  good  to  be  objective  and  subsistent  in   itself, 


CONCLUSIOX  51 

takin<2r  away  every  relation?  Tliat  would  be  a  catharsis,  psycho- 
logically impossibli',  since  a  thing  has  no  value  and  is  no  longer  a 
good  as  soon  as  it  has  no  relation  to  anything  else.  Since,  accord- 
ing to  Rosmini,  an  idea  is  constituted  by  matter  ami  form,  how  does 
he  imagine  idea  to  be  mere  form,  without  any  relation  to  matter? 
If  subject  and  object,  matter  and  form,  ideal  possibility  and  reality, 
are  correlative  terms,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  one  without  the 
other.  The  belief  in  an  ideal  order  apart  from  the  real,  and  exist- 
ing in  itself,  stripped  from  every  previous  relation  to  the  real,  is  the 
belief  in  metaphysical  dreams. 

An  ethics  which  claims  to  be  scientific  must  present  a  conception 
or  moral  good  that  nuiy  be  human,  immanent,  dynamic,  developing 
tlirough,  and  sinndtanc^usly  with,  i)syehological  factors  of  indi- 
vidual and  social  order  as  well. — To  sum  up  what  has  been  said,  the 
chief  error  in  Rosmini 's  etiiical  theory  is  that  it  has  for  basis  ide- 
ology, and  not  a  psychology  of  human  nature.  His  native  qualities, 
however,  his  bias,  his  environment,  the  prevalence  of  ronumticism 
over  classicism,  the  great  spiritual  influence  of  Christian  ideas, 
could  not  fail  to  determine  Rosmini 's  mind  to  seek  a  system  of 
morals  in  the  region  of  metaphysics  and  of  a  rationalism  which  he 
thought  immune  to  change,  while  everything  was  changing.  Such  a 
system  of  ethics  as  he  considered  to  be  the  most  urgently  needed,  the 
great  Italian  philosopher  offered  to  his  country,  which  he  hoped  to 
see  morally  renewed  and  become  politically  united  and  independent. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

1.  On  Bos7nini's  Life,  see  Paoli,   "Memorie   della  vita  A.    Rosmini-Serbati, " 

Turin,  1880-84;  "Antonio  Rosmini  e  la  sua  prosapia,"  Rovereto,  1880; 
"Epistolario  completo  di  A.  Rosmini-Serbati,"  Turin,  Casale:  1887-94; 
W.  Lockart,  "Life  of  A.  Rosmini-Serbati,"  London:  Kegan,  Trench,  and 
Co.,  1886;  Anon.,  "La  Vita  di  A.  Rosmini,"  Turin,  1897;  Anon.,  "Pie- 
cola  Vita  di  A.  Rosmini,"  Casale,  1897;  "The  Life  of  A.  Rosmini-Ser- 
bati," tr.  from  the  Italian  of  Pagani,  London,  1907. 

2.  Literature  on  the  political  situation  of  Rosmini's  Italy  is  abundant.     See, 

however,  Rey  R.,  "Histoire  de  la  renaissance  politique  de  1'  Italie, " 
Paris,  1864;  Stillman,  W.  J.,  "The  Union  of  Italy"  (1815-189.5),  Cam- 
bridge: At  the  University  Press,  1899;  Martinengo-Cesaresco  Evelyn.  L. 
Ilazeldine  (Carrington),  "The  Liberation  of  Italy,"  London:  Seeley 
and  Co.,  1895;  Pietro  Orsi,  "L 'Italia  Moderna,"  English  Ed.,  London: 
Fisher;  New  York:  Putnam,  1900;  German  Ed.,  Leipzig:  Teubner,  1902; 
Italian  Ed.,  Milano:  Hoepli,  1910;  Tyffe  C.  A.,  "A  History  of  Modern 
Europe,"  New  York:  Henry  Holt  and  Co.,  1896;  W.  Alison  Phillips, 
"Modern  Europe,"  2  vols.  London:  Rivingstons,  1905;  "The  Cambridge 
Modern  History,"  planned  by  Lord  Acton,  edited  by  A.  W.  Ward  and  G. 
W.  Prothero,  vol.  X  and  vol.  XI,  New  York:  The  Macmillan  Co.;  Quinet, 
"Revolutions  d 'Italic,"  Paris;  B^renger,  H.,  "Les  Resurrections  Ital- 
iennes, "  Paris:  E.  Pelletan,  1911;  Tivaroni,  "Storia  critica  del  Risorgi- 
mento  Italiano, "  etc. 

3.  For  the  intellectual  condition  of  Bosmini's  Italy,  besides  those  referred  to 

above,  see  Tivaroni  C,  "Lo  svolgimento  del  pensiero  nazionale,"  3  vols., 
Turin,  1894;  De  Sanctis,  F.,  "Storia  della  Letteratura  Italiana,"  2  vols., 
Napoli:  A.  Morano,  1909;  "La  Letteratura  Italiana  nel  secolo  XIX," 
Napoli:  A.  Morano,  1902;  G.  Cardueci,  "Dello  svolgimento  della  letter- 
atura nazionale  in  Italia;"  G.  Guerzoni,  "II  terzo  rinaseimento, "  Milan: 
Hoepli.  G.  Barzellotti,  "La  letteratura  e  la  rivoluzione  in  Italia  avanti  e 
dopo  il  1848  e  -49;"  G.  Barzellotti,  "Dal  Rinaseimento  al  Risorgimento," 
Palermo:  R.  Sandron,  1909;  G.  Barzellotti,  "La  nostra  letteratura  e 
I'anima  nazionale,"  Nuova  Antologia,  p.  193,  ser.  4,  vol.  93,  Roma,  1901; 
Mazzoni,  "L'Ottocento,"  Milano:  Vallardi;  Marasea  A.,  "Le  Origini 
del  roniantismo  italiano,"  Roma:  E.  Loescher  &  Co.,  1910;  Luehaire,  ,T., 
"L'Evolution  Tntellectuelle  de  I'ltalie  de  1815  a  1830,"  Paris:  Hachette 
et  Cie,  1906;  Seignobos,  C,  "History  of  Contemporary  Civilization," 
New  York:  C.  Scribner's  Sons,  1909;  Draper,  "History  of  the  Intellectual 
Development  in  Europe,"  2  vol..  New  York:  Harper,  1876;  Flint,  R., 
"History  of  the  Philosophy  of  History,"  New  York:  C.  Scribner's  Sons, 
1894. 

4.  On  Bosmini's  Philosophy,  See  Bartholmeso,  "Histoire  critique  des  doctrines 

religieuses  de  la  philosophic  moderne, "  Paris,  1855;  M.  Debrit,  "Histoire 
des  doctrines  philosophiques  dan  I'ltalie  contemporaine, "  Paris:  Meyrueis, 
1859;  A.  Conti,  "Storia  della  filosofia."  2  vols.,  Firenze:  Barbera,  1864; 
and  La  filosofia  contemporanea  in  Italia,  1865;   Mariano,  R.,  "La  philos- 

52 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  ■.,•'':   .:;'53' 

ophie  contemporaino  en  Italie, "  Paris:  Gcrmer  Bailli^re,  1868;  Ferri,  L., 
"  P]ssai  sur  I'histoire  de  la  philosophio  en  Italie  au  XIX*  sidcle, "  2  vols., 
Paris:  Didier,  IS69;  G.  Barzellotti,  "Philosophy  in  Italy,"  in  Mind, 
1878,  vol.  JII,  pp.  505-538  (a  rapid  but  careful  survey  of  the  Italian 
philosophical  movement  during  the  nineteenth  century)  ;  Fiorentino,  "La 
filosofia  contemporauea  in  Italia." 
Barth^iemy  Saint-llilaire,  "Victor  Cousin,  sa  vie,  sa  correspondence,"  Paris, 
1895,  vol.  Ill,  p.  379,  the  influence  of  sensationalism  on  Italy  at  that 
epoch;  K,  Werner,  "Die  italienische  Philosophic  dea  XlXten  Jahrhun- 
derts,"  5  vols.,  Wien:  Faesy,  1884-87.  See  vol.  I,  "  Roscniini  and  seine 
Schule,"  by  the  same;  "A.  liosmini  Stelluug  in  der  Geschichte  dor  neuren 
Philosophie, "  1884,  vol.  XXXV,  Denkschrift  der  philosophistorich.  Claase 
der  Koniglichen  Academie  der  Wissenschaf ten,  Wien.  Ueberweg,  * '  History 
of  Philosophy,  vol.  II,  Italian  contemporary  pliilosophy,  pp.  482  fit;  Win- 
delband,  "History  of  i'hilosophy,"  pp.  G24,  031;  H.  lliiffding,  "  Phiios- 
ophes  contemporains, "  Paris :  F.  Alcan,  1908,  p.  37,  "La  philosophie 
italienne  apr^  la  Renaissance." 

A  bibliography,  tolerably  complete,  of  Rosmini  's  own  writings  and  of  the 
works  dealing  with  his  life  and  philosophy  may  be  found  in  the  philo- 
sophical system  of  A.  Rosmini-Serbati,  trans,  by  Thomas  Davidson,  pp. 
lii-lxxxviii,  in  Baldwin's  Dictionary  of  Phil,  and  Psych.,  p.  444,  vol.  Ill, 
Part  I,  and  in  Palhorifes's,  "La  philosophie  de  Rosmini,"  Paris:  F. 
Alcan,  1908,  pp.  389-394.  The  treatises  in  which  Roi-niini  sets  forth  his 
ethical  teaching  and  which  are  connected  with  it  are  "  Teodicea  "  (1828), 
English  trans.,  vol.  3,  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1912;  "  Nuovo  Saggio 
8ul  rOrigine  delle  Idee,"  1830,  English  trans.,  London:  Kegan.  1883- 
1884;  "Psicologia"  (1846-1850);  English  trans.,  London:  Kegan,  3 
vols.  1884,  1885,  1888;  "Principii  della  scieuza  morale"  (1831);  "Storia 
comparativa  e  critica  de'  sistemi  intorno  al  Principio  della  morale" 
(1837)  ;  "  Antropologia  in  servivio  della  scienza  morale"  (1838) ;  "Trat- 
tato  della  coscienza  morale"  (1839);  "Filosofia  del  Diritto"  (1841- 
45);  "Compendio  di  Etica, "  published  at  Turin  (1847)  under  a  false 
name,  and  republished   (Roma:  Desclee,  1907)   under  Rosmini 's  name. 


VITA 

John  Favata  Bnino  was  born  the  10th  February,  1877,  at  Santa 
Caterina  Villarmosa  (Italj-).  He  had  his  preliminary  education,  and 
pursued  literary,  scientific,  and  philosophic  studies  in  his  native 
country.  After  receiving  his  Licenza  Liceale  (1897),  he  achieved  a 
course  of  high  religious  studies  in  the  Great  French  Seminary  St. 
Louis  which  lies  upon  the  ruins  of  the  old  Carthage. 

In  Columbia  University,  he  studied  (1910-13)  philosophy  under 
Professors  John  Dewey,  Frederick  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  Wendell  T. 
Bush,  George  Stuart  Fullerton,  Felix  Adler,  William  Pepperrell 
Montague,  and  Walter  B.  Pitkin;  and  psychology  under  Professors 
James  McKeen  Cattell,  Robert  Sessions  Woodworth,  S.  S.  Colvin, 
and  the  Kaiser  Wilhelm  Exchange  Professor.  Felix  Krueger. 


54 


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